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I. INTRODUCTION
Popularly referred to as the “IP Clause,” Article I, Section 8, clause
8 of the United States Constitution states that Congress may grant
patents and copyrights so as “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts.”1 The IP Clause’s limits on Congress’s enumerated
power to regulate patent and copyright have prompted a fierce scholarly debate on the text, structure, and history of the IP Clause.
I contend, however, that amidst this fierce debate, we have ignored
another important purpose of the IP Clause: its role as a constitutional norm. A constitutional norm, as identified by Hiroshiro
Motomura, is an interpretative principle that judges use to analyze
“rules in subconstitutional forms,” such as “statutes, regulations, and
administrative guidelines.”2 The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) has invoked the text of the IP Clause as an interpretative canon of construction in assessing the Patent Act of 1952 and,
more uniquely, the constitutional common law doctrines that form the
doctrinal content of the patent-law regime.
The invocation of the IP Clause is often a signal that the Court will
weigh the rights of the individual patentees against the public consequence associated with an improvidently granted patent. While there
are many examples of constitutional norms in patent law, this Article
traces the use of this particular constitutional norm, what I identify as
the social-obligation principle, during the Progressive Era. During
this era, the Supreme Court used the social-obligation principle as a
way to impose obligations on the patentee to act in ways that did not
harm the public. In doing so, the Court attempted, through common
law doctrines in contract and property law, to regulate the harmful
impact of a patent.
This Article seeks to achieve two goals by analyzing the social-obligation principle and its relationship to the IP Clause.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
2. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548
(1990); see also Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 459 (1989) (“Interpretative principles are often a product of
constitutional norms.”) (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975)).
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First, this Article adds to an ongoing debate over whether the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent intervention into intellectual property law is
necessary or even appropriate. The use of constitutional norms, such
as the use of the social-obligation principle, is not well understood
within the relevant scholarly literature nor has it been recognized
within the doctrinal content of the Federal Circuit.3 Examining judicial use of the IP Clause as a constitutional principle is helpful in explaining what often appears to be confusing or contradictory choices
on the part of the Supreme Court.
Beyond that, the Supreme Court’s utilization of constitutional
norms such as the social-obligation principle has not been viewed as a
legitimate act of constitutional interpretation.4 I contend, however
that the Supreme Court’s use of the social-obligation principle is an
appropriate and legitimate institutional intervention into the doctrinal formation of the modern patent regime. I take seriously Craig
Nard’s initial claim that the “the reform-minded engage patent law’s
traditional policy driver[—]the judiciary”5—by emphasizing the relevance, and more importantly, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s
own interpretative traditions in the modern patent regime.
Second, this Article suggests that to fully comprehend the direction
that modern patent law is headed, intellectual property law scholars
and practitioners must begin to think more like their constitutional
counterparts. What does this mean in practice? Any substantive
analysis of constitutional intellectual property law should not only focus on the particular text of the IP Clause, but should also focus on
how particular judges interpret the IP Clause. By viewing patent law
through the lens of constitutional principles, scholars and practitioners will be able to trace the doctrinal lineages of particular Justices on
the Supreme Court, and furthermore, determine that their particular
interpretative reasoning in a given case is not unpredictable.
3. For example, the Federal Circuit has typically only invoked the term “public interest” in its consideration of the grant of preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008); GP Indus. v.
Eran Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Hoop v. Hoop, 279 F.3d
1004, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural
Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cynamid
Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Illinois Tool Works v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906
F.3d 679, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth Burchfiel, Revising the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory
in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1989) (criticizing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), and associated lines of cases as an
example of the Supreme Court’s use of pseudohistory in constitutional analysis).
5. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV.
51, 55 (2010) (discussing the relationship between constitutional framework,
common law adjudication, and statutory design).
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The existence of a social-obligation principle, therefore, is a useful
vehicle for predicting how Supreme Court justices will react to constitutional challenges within the patent regime. Moreover, sensitivity to
the complexity embedded within constitutional patent law helps us to
move beyond what has increasingly become a circular debate over the
relationship of the IP Clause to congressional authority. In turn, this
will allow both scholars and practitioners to engage in a more meaningful reading of the ways in which the relevant actors can construct
the doctrines associated with constitutional intellectual property law.
This Article, then, is both a recovery and recognition. I seek to recover the evolving doctrinal contours of the social-obligation principle
and to recognize its relationship to the institutional regulation of patent law.
In Part II of this Article, I review the usefulness of historical
method in recovery of the particular interpretative principle. Specifically, I claim that we need to employ a multivariate historical method,
which emphasizes how law can often simultaneously reflect and respond to different economic, political, and social trends. By using a
multivariate historical method, I focus on how innovative and social
disruption produced significant doctrinal evolution in constitutional
patent law during a time of formative change in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century.6
In Part III of this Article, I describe the evolution of the socialobligation principle7 in constitutional doctrines associated with patent
law. Initially, I contend that during the Progressive Era, the Supreme
Court used two distinct areas of common law—contract law and property law8—to ground the social-obligation principle into constitutional
patent law.9 Property law and contract law offered different doctrinal
approaches to one key question: how could the law respond to the so6. For ease of reference, I will refer to this time period from 1870 until 1920 as the
early modern period in patent law. I regard the passage of the Patent Act of 1952
as the modern period in patent law.
7. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (defining social obligation norm and its implication
for the property law of the United States).
8. This tradition was based on the interpretative claim that a patent is “property.”
See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (asserting that “patent rights are property rights, entitled to just compensation when taken by the United States”), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 672 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
9. As I describe below, the term constitutional patent law can be described in many
ways, for instance, it can describe interpretations of the patents statutes, see infra section II.A, it can describe a constitutional common law, see infra section
II.A, or it can describe the application of other areas of constitutional practice to
patents, see, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689,
700–07 (2007) (describing how, around the turn of the nineteenth century, courts
repeatedly held that patents were a type of constitutional property).
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cial and innovative harms of the patent owner to the public interest? I
conclude that the Supreme Court ultimately consolidated these two
lines of doctrinal content into a key metaphor of modern constitutional
patent law, the resonant metaphor of the constitutional patent bargain. Tracing this historical lineage of the patent bargain is important in a theoretical sense as it helps us to trace the impact of social
and innovative disruption in patent law, and in a practical sense, as
the Supreme Court has used it as a key interpretative method in assessing the statutory terms of the Patent Act of 1952.
In Part IV, I examine the importance of the social-obligation principle as a constitutional norm. I suggest that we view the social-obligation principle in light of a model of constitutional complexity in
patent law. This model emphasizes two elements. First, it stresses
that we need to examine the ongoing use of constitutional norms in
the modern patent regime by focusing on the ongoing use of constitutional norms, along with examining different doctrinal lineages. This
practical recognition of constitutional complexity will help us to appropriately assess the intellectual property jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court. Second, my model of constitutional complexity seeks to stress
the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s use of this constitutional norm within the current doctrinal formation of patent law. In
particular, I stress that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been
necessary in patent law to provide an institutional space for social
movements to challenge the basic norms of the overall patent regime
that has been committed to epistemic insularity.
II. HISTORICAL METHOD AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN PATENT LAW
In this section of this Article, after examining the use of diverse
methods, I examine the historical circumstances that produced the
significant doctrinal response embodied in the social-obligation principle. I adopt Alfred Brophy’s view that legal history should explore the
development of law through multiple lenses so as to view the law as a
“partial catalyst and at other times [as] the dependent variable that
helps us gauge cultural and economic evolution.”10 A central claim of
this Part, therefore, is that the Supreme Court’s gradual use of constitutional norms, such as the social-obligation principle, reflected the
impact of two crosscutting variables: innovative and social disruption.
10. Alfred L. Brophy, Multivariate Analysis Through Narrative History, 15 GREEN
BAG 2D 465, 467 (2012). Brophy’s model, as applied, is directed toward analyzing
Edward White’s recent work, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: VOLUME I (2012), which
is a narrative history, rather than an examination of doctrinal evolution. I have
modified Brophy’s model in this Article, by utilizing the multivariate approach to
case law. In doing so, I have selected two variables—social and innovative disruption—to utilize as ways to focus the examination of this material.
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Innovative and social disruption reflected the complex relationship between political and social actors in the making of patent law.
Section II.A, after examining various historical methods in assessing constitutional development within patent law, introduces and emphasizes the importance of a multivariate approach in assessing
constitutional development in intellectual property law. In section
II.B, by employing this multivariable approach, I explore how two
crosscutting variables—social and innovative disruption—impacted
the formation of constitutional patent law during the Progressive Era.
A.

Historical Method in Patent Law

Tracing the existence of constitutional norms, such as the socialobligation principle, is essentially an elusive act of reconstruction for
two reasons. First, judges use constitutional norms in different ways.
Initially, Hiroshiro Motomura noted that constitutional norms may
govern “expressly constitutional decisions.”11 Therefore, judicial use
of constitutional norms can be applied to expressly constitutional decisions such as whether the IP Clause can limit the passage of congressional legislation. Additionally, Motomura claims that constitutional
norms can be used as an interpretative canon that permits courts to
“interpret statutes so as to avoid constitutional doubt[s].”12 Thus, judicial use of constitutional norms can also be used to resolve disputes
over the meaning of a particular term in a statute or administrative
guideline. Consequently, tracing the use of constitutional norms can
be very difficult.
This difficulty further arises in patent law, which enjoys a rich constitutional common law tradition. Henry Monaghan defines constitutional common law as a “substructure of substantive, procedural, and
remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not
required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.”13 Craig Nard has noted how federal patent law
incorporates common law in intellectual property law.14 For instance,
the modern patent regime incorporates common law exceptions to 35
U.S.C. § 101,15 the existence of the doctrine of equivalents within the
infringement of patents,16 and the experimental use doctrine.17 Using constitutional principles to interpret a judicially created doctrine
11. Motomura, supra note 2, at 561.
12. Id.
13. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1975).
14. Nard, supra note 5, at 54.
15. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
16. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
17. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
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intensifies what is an already complex set of choices in the doctrinal
formation of patent law.
Second, constitutional norms, such as the social-obligation principle, reflect the significant interpretative autonomy enjoyed by judicial
actors within the constitutional regime. Interpretative judicial autonomy suggests that any decision making can be shaped by individual
idiosyncrasies, some political in nature, or others more personal in nature.18 Thus, some form of contextual analysis—whether anthropological, philosophical, empirical, sociological, economic, or historical—
is necessary to explain the basis behind why any given judge may utilize a specific constitutional norm, such as the social-obligation
principle.
I employ historical analysis as a specific contextual tool for this
Article to resolve these difficulties. An historical lens best captures
how these constitutional norms emerged as a response to the fundamental restructuring of the American political economy. Fundamental restructuring of the political economy in the United States has
occurred three times during the modern patent era: in the late nineteenth century during the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and arguably, our current era.19 Historical analysis within law, of course,
brings its own choices as to the appropriate method. As discussed below, I apply a specific historical method—the multivariate method—in
my historical analysis of intellectual property law.
Before I do so, I want to briefly examine the historical methods
typically applied within the legal history of intellectual property to
place my specific approach in context. I do so because of a belief that
intellectual property historians need to make their evidentiary and
ideological choices more fully available for evaluation. The legal his18. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1322–24 (2008) (examining this phenomenon as it
plays out during the judicial opinion-writing process).
19. Robert Radin has identified three primary eras in the development of regulatory
politics: (1) the Populist and Progressive Era; (2) the New Deal Era; and (3) the
Public Interest Era. Robert L. Radin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); see also MORTON KELLER, AMERICA’S THREE
REGIMES 3 (2007) (assessing the relationship of America’s public life into three
regimes: deferential-republic (1790–1820); party-democratic (1830–1930); and
populist-bureaucratic (1930–Present)). The relationship of patent law to the regulatory state has recently gained historical attention. Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (2011)
(analyzing changes in the administrative patent regime during the New Deal
Era); Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative
State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2009) (analyzing how legal realism as a theoretical model emphasized a linkage between the exercise of patent rights and the
theoretical foundations of the modern state). For ease of reference, I will refer to
the Progressive and Populist Era as the “Progressive Era,” as the periods have
significant overlap and, thus, are not easy to distinguish within a historical
analysis.
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tory of intellectual property corresponds closely to the primary categories of legal history as identified by Alfred Brophy. The first category
is internalist legal history, which focuses on the “history of legal doctrine, lawyers’ practices, and legal institutions.”20 The second category is sociolegal history, which “links legal institutions to society, to
see how law reflects social values.”21 The final category is embedded
legal history, which seeks to examine how law is interpreted in a
broader culture “by people who had never read a legal treatise or seen
the inside of law school classroom.”22
By far, the most influential method in the legal history of intellectual property has been the internalist approach, within which legal
historians seek to trace the doctrinal and statutory development of intellectual property law.23 Critiques of internalist methods have been
centered on its evidential and conceptual insularity.24 Such insularity
is apparent as well in internalist intellectual property history, as its
basic intent was to introduce practitioners to primary sources that
would aid in crafting arguments before judicial tribunals.25 Its evidentiary base was then correspondingly conservative, employing
traditional legal sources, including published patents, cases, statutes,
and constitutional texts.26 Internalist methods were further limited
20.
21.
22.
23.

Brophy, supra note 10, at 465.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Prominent examples of the internalist approach within legal history of intellectual property include the works of Edward C. Walterscheid. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836 (1998); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1
(1994) (having been cited in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), and Figueroa
v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139 (Fed. Cl. 2005)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (U.S. 2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Walterscheid); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (addressing the issue of patentable subject
matter on appeal); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing
Walterscheid).
24. Mark Tushnet has critiqued evidentiary and conceptual insularity in his methodology of internalist legal history. Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-In-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 909, 922–24 (1996)
(assessing the evidentiary and conceptual treatment of historical material within
an internalist methodology).
25. Examples of internalist methods include E. Wyndam Hulme, The History of the
Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 L.Q. REV. 141
(1896) (assessing primary sources related to early English patent law); Ramon
Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
615 (1959); Guilo Mandich, Venetian Patents, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948)
(collecting and evaluating patents from Venice); Frank Prager, Historical Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309, 324
(1951) (summarizing sources from the constitutional era).
26. See, e.g., HARRY TOULMIN, JR., PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1939) (assessing the relationship of patents to public policy for a general audience).
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because they failed to incorporate methods within standard historical
practices, among them the history of science and technology,27 the history of economic development,28 social and cultural history,29 intellectual history,30 or institutional history.31
The insularity of the internalist method is troubling because each
category of historical method offers relevant insight into the doctrinal
formation of patent law. Recent scholarly work in intellectual property history has reduced this conceptual and evidential insularity.
Scholars have instead adopted either a “sociolegal” approach or, alternatively, an “embedded legal” approach. In particular, sociolegal
method in intellectual property history has flourished.32 This predominant legal approach has been to link intellectual property law to
technological change and innovation within society. Other sociolegal
27. See, e.g., Pamela Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual Property,” and the Origins of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & CULT. 846 (1991)
(“As it pertains to technology, ‘intellectual property’ involves particular attributes
toward craft knowledge and practice, invention, and authorship, and is properly
studied within the context of these intrinsically related issues.”).
28. See, e.g., ZORINA B. KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005) (assessing
the relationship of intellectual property institutions in understanding the economic growth of the United States). Notably, the history of economic development in the United States introduced an interdisciplinary perspective into
intellectual property history during the preeminence of internalist orthodoxy.
See, e.g., Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 6–7 (1950) (assessing the controversy related
to the efficacy of patent regimes for economic development in the nineteenth
century).
29. See, e.g., VENUS GREEN, RACE ON THE LINE: GENDER, LABOR AND TECHNOLOGY IN
THE BELL SYSTEM, 1880–1890 (2001) (examining the relationship between race,
gender and innovation in telecommunications).
30. See, e.g., Michael B. Levy, Freedom, Property and the Levellers: The Case of John
Lilburne, 36 W. POL. Q. 116, 123–24 (1983) (examining the relationship between
property, patents, and democratic accountability in the work of Puritan political
theorist John Liliburne).
31. Louis Galambos & Jane Elliot Sewell, NETWORKS OF INNOVATION: VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AT MERCK, SHARP AND DOHLME, AND MULFORD 1895–1995 (1997) (examining the relationship between research, innovation, and corporate structure in
pharmaceutical development).
32. An assessment of the sociolegal method from a macrohistorical level includes
Robert F. Merges. See Robert F. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2215–17 (2000) (analyzing the development of intellectual property law in the twentieth century as a response to
technological change). An assessment of the sociolegal method from specific industrial case studies to gauge the relationship between innovation and legal development include Lea Shaver. See Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From
Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891 (2012) (employing a
case study methodology so as to understand the development of patent innovation); see also, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 166 (2011) (employing a case study methodology to understand the model of patent thickets).
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methodologies have emerged as well, among them the sociocultural
method33 and an institutional method.34 Less frequently, scholars
have used an embedded legal method35 to examine the relationship of
social movements in the development of intellectual property law.
What have these new methods in intellectual property taught us?
At its most basic sense, increased scholarly use of sociolegal method
and embedded legal method directs us to new types of evidentiary
sources in patent law. For example, Kara Swanson utilizes treatises
prepared by patent agents after the passage of the Patent Act of 1836
in her examination of authorship in the patent regime.36 These new
evidentiary sources include letters or popular texts, such as patent
treatises,37 general audience books,38 novels,39 political publications,
33. The sociocultural method has been exemplified by the work of Mario Biagioli and
Kara Swanson. See, e.g., Mario Biagioli, Patent Republics: Representing Inventions, Construction Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1132 (2006) (examining the cultural production of patent specifications and its relationship to
representative politics); see also, e.g., Kara Swanson, Getting a Grip on the Corset:
Gender, Sexuality and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57 (2011) (examining the relationship between gender and legal precedent of patent law in the late
nineteenth century).
34. The institutional method has been adopted by John Duffy and Craig Nard. See,
e.g., John Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ambition, Jacksonian Realism, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071 (2000) (examining the institutional history of the Federal Communications Commission); Andrew Morriss & Craig Allen
Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1870, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 66–67 (2011) (outlining the importance of interest groups within the development of statutory law during the
nineteenth century), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8T6V-J6VF.
35. A few scholars have used an embedded legal method to examine the relationship
of social movements in the development of intellectual property law. See, e.g.,
Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 346 (2011) (examining the impact of a democratization of fame on the emergence of the right of publicity); Susan Sell &
Christopher May, Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of
Intellectual Property Law, 8:3 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 467, 468 (2001) (claiming
that the “development of intellectual property has been a contested political process producing successive phases or settlement or institutionalization.”).
36. KARA SWANSON, Authoring an Invention: Patent Production in the Nineteenth
Century, in MAKING AND UNMASKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41, 45–49 (Mario
Biagioli, Peter Jaszi, & Martha Woodmansee eds., 2011).
37. See, e.g., THOMAS GREEN FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW
INVENTIONS (1823) (summarizing patent law in the early United States); THOMAS
GREEN FESSENDEN, THE REGISTER OF ARTS, OR A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF SOME OF
THE MOST USEFUL MODERN DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS (1808) (collecting a set
of patents in an early treatise). Fessenden’s role in patent law in the United
States is an example of how a broader evidentiary analysis within patent law can
add to our substantive understanding of the doctrinal formation of the early patent regime, given his complementary role in early American literature. See
George L. Roth, American Theory of Satire, 1790–1820, 29 AM. LIT. 399, 403
(1958). Fessenden’s role in early American literature suggests an interesting relationship between patent law and the cultural life of the early republic. See generally BEYOND THE FOUNDERS: NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF
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and speeches.40 New evidentiary sources are important in helping us
to assess the complex interactions between formal authority and informal action in the making of patent law.
In a more important sense, these new methodologies have provided
us with a conceptually rich framework for describing the doctrinal formation of patent law. My use of the term “doctrinal formation” is a
deliberate one insofar as the term captures two conceptual insights
that result from recent scholarship. First, the doctrinal content of intellectual property law, generally, and patent law, specifically, is quite
diverse as it consists of constitutional law, statutory law, and common
law. Second, the means by which such a doctrine is formed, whether
through administrative, legislative, judicial, or social activism, also
matters in how we perceive the doctrinal evolution of the patent regime. Embedded legal methodology, specifically, is sensitive to the
questions of praxis—how attorneys, judges, and members of social
movements utilize different methods to impact doctrinal change in the
law.41
B.

Innovative and Social Disruption in Patent Law:
A Multivariate Analysis

These richer historical methods help us to understand how the doctrinal formation of patent law has been impacted by broader historical
trends. As discussed above, multivariate historical method offers a
way to explore the relationship between historical factors and the doctrinal formation of law. Multivariate method encompasses two basic
claims. First, multivariate method emphasizes that diverse economic
and social factors may impact doctrinal formation in the law. The
availability of richer historical methods suggests that the doctrinal
formation of patent law is impacted simultaneously by many different
factors. These factors include innovative business practices within
particular industries, as well as the social changes such practices can
produce in the status of individuals and groups within a given society,
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson & David
Waldstreicher eds., 2004) (collecting articles on the relationship of cultural formation and the political culture of the Early Republic).
See, e.g., Giles S. Rich Papers (1790–1999) (unpublished collection of the correspondence of Giles S. Rich on a range of patent issues) (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, OLC Number 70979785).
CLARE PETTITT, PATENT INVENTIONS—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE VICTORIAN NOVEL (2004) (analyzing the treatment of patent and copyright law in the
literature of the Victorian Era).
See, e.g., Veto Message—Bank of the United States (July 10, 1832), in THE
STATEMANSHIP OF ANDREW JACKSON AS TOLD IN HIS WRITING AND SPEECHES 154,
167 (1909) (assessing the relationship of IP Clause to congressional authority).
See KALI MURRAY, THE POLITICS OF PATENT LAW: CRAFTING THE PARTICIPATORY
PATENT BARGAIN 103 (2012).
THE

38.
39.
40.
41.
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and the subsequent political and judicial response to these events.
Any account of doctrinal formation in patent law, then, must view the
impacts of innovative and social disruption together.
Second, multivariate method stresses the important of attempting
to analyze the fluid relationship between formal authority and informal action in the law. Specifically, we need to assess how diverse social and political actors besides traditional judicial actors such as
judges or lawyers, impact the doctrinal formation of the law. Recent
work by constitutional scholars such as Reva Seigel and Lani Guiner
emphasizes how the social and political activities of popular social
movements such as the Civil Rights Movement or abortion rights activism may impact the formal legal decision making of judges, legislators, and administrators.42 Multivariate method stresses both
perceived failures of law that served as a catalyst for social change,
and the legal system’s response to those changes.
1.

Innovative Disruption in the Progressive Era

Two trends—innovative disruption and social disruption—interacted to create the conditions for significant legal change in patent law
in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Innovative disruption occurs when a patent, a series of patents, or risk and
strategic management practices associated with patents prompt a significant reordering of competitive relationships in a given industry.43
Innovative disruption can be perceived as creative within the industrial order, but, equally, it is perceived as destructive to the industrial
order. Recent examples of innovative disruption in patent law involve
the Apple–Samsung disputes, which have revealed innovative business practices around the acquisition of the patents themselves and
around the management of patent portfolios.44
42. Lani Guiner, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide,
89 B.U. L. REV. 539 (2009); Reva Seigel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1323 (2006).
43. I use a model here suggested by Lea Shaver that claims that examination of innovation norms may work best in utilizing a case-based historical method. Lea
Shaver, supra note 32, at 1900–07.
44. Christianna Edrington, Smartphone Wars: Emphasizing eBay’s First Two Factors in Smartphone Patent Injunctions, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013)
(recommending that, to ensure innovation and to protect the patentee’s property
rights, judges must reassess the weight of the factors they consider when deciding whether to grant an injunction); Nick Wingfeld, Jury Awards $1 Billion to
Apple in Samsung Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-apple-samsung-patent-trial
.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G62P-7CLJ (noting that the disputes could mean two things: consumers could experience some discomfort as
they will have to adapt if smartphone manufacturers are forced to design around
Apple’s patents to avoid infringement suits, or the decision could prompt more
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Patent law underwent significant innovative disruption in the late
nineteenth century. For instance, in his 1889 work, Monopolies and
the People, Charles Whiting Barker noted the ways in which “patents
sometimes aid in the formation of trusts and combinations. Two or
three firms may control all the valuable patents in connection with
some important industry. If they agree to combine their interests and
work in harmony, they are far stronger than ordinary trusts because
the patents they hold prevent outside competition.”45
Innovative disruption in nineteenth century United States occurred in many different industries. The railroad industry, for instance, is a paradigmatic example of the impact of innovative
disruption. Steven Usselman has examined how railroads utilized cooperative structures such as patent pools to distribute technological
information to suppliers so as to increase standardization throughout
the railroad network.46 Assessing doctrinal response to innovative
disruption can be difficult because the impact of innovative disruption
can vary significantly within any given industrial context.47 This ensuing dynamic of industrial variability means that legal response is
difficult because changes in the doctrinal content of patent law may
favor one industrial model of innovation at the expense of others.48

45.

46.
47.

48.

innovation); Eric Zeman, Apple vs. Samsung: Apple Wins Battle but Losing War?,
INFORMATION WEEK (May 5, 2014), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mo
bile-devices/apple-vs-samsung-apple-wins-battle-but-losing-war/d/d-id/1235068,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/U5SD-F8HW?type=image (noting that despite
the monetary damages awarded, Apple might want to reassess how effective its
anti-Android campaign has been as Android and its supporters have out innovated Apple in recent quarters).
CHARLES WHITING BARKER, MONOPOLIES AND THE PEOPLE 91 (1889). Other
sources from the same period also discuss the relationship to patents and trusts.
See also DEBATES ON TRUSTS, BETWEEN O.C. BARNER AND THE HONORABLE J.A.
KOHLER 56 (1889) (critiquing the use of intellectual property assets in the creation of trusts).
Steven Usselman, Patents Purloined: Railroads, Inventors and the Diffusion of
Innovation in 19th-Century America, 32 TECH. & CULT. 1047 (1991).
Christine Macleod has identified variability in industrial development across different industries (electricity, aviation, and agricultural botany) in England between 1870 and 1930. Christine MacLeod, Reluctant Entrepreneurs: Patents and
State Patronage in New Technosciences, Circa 1870–1930, 103 ISIS 328 (2012).
Such variability in systems has meant that different industries “established an
idiosyncratic relationship with the patent system or with other aspects of IP,
which would both influence their emergent disciplines and affect the extent to
which commercial enterprise could be a viable strategy.” Id. at 331.
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKLEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) (asserting that although patent law is industry-neutral in theory, its application is industry specific; therefore, applying different
standards to similar inventions raises concerns about horizontal equity).

914
2.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:901

Social Disruption in the Progressive Era

Social disruption, by contrast, does not involve intra-industrial relationships. Rather, social disruption in patent law occurs when the
grant and issuance of patents disrupts preexisting social relationships
between the patentee and other parties that seek to access and use the
material embodied in the claimed invention. The concept of social disruption in patent law is derived from an equivalent treatment of social
disruption in property law. Social disruption in property law is a concept tied to an ancillary claim that suggests that formal property law
and informal property customs can reinforce the social relations of a
given society.49 Thus, during eras of extreme change in property relations, informal property customs are often disrupted. Social practices
depend on preexisting use practices that can be disrupted by a formal
claim of ownership. Consequently, changes in property customs (use
practices) are perceived as negative changes in social relationships.50
Conflicts over social disruption in patent law reflect this trend. A
current example of social disruption in patent law is evident in the
disputes over genetic patents. The patent holder’s claim to own property in genetic information appears to be disruptive to the social practices that surround collaborative practices in academic practice and
the relationship between health care practitioners, counselors, and
their patients.51
Two preeminent kinds of social disruption occurred in the late
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century in the United
States. Industrial labor practices and subsequent ownership over patented work shifted significantly in the late-nineteenth-century United
States. Catherine Fisk has explored how the rise of the modern corporation shifted ownership of invented goods from employees to employers and the resulting impact on patent doctrines such as trade secrets,
restrictive covenants, and the work made for hire doctrine.52
49. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 207 (1975)
(“Since property was a thing, it became possible to define offences as crimes
against things, rather than as injuries to men. This enabled the law to assume,
with its robes, the posture of impartiality: it was neutral as between every degree
of man, and defended only the inviolability of the ownership of things.”).
50. JENNIFER NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN ENGLAND, 1700–1820, at 290 (1993) (examining the legal process of enclosure
and its impact on the process of common rights in open pastures).
51. Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 403, 407–09 (2005)
(assessing the impact of genetic patents on health care practices).
52. CATHERINE FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800–1930, at 2 (2009) (analyzing the “origins of corporate ownership of employee knowledge as a legal construct and as a
business practice”).
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Agricultural labor practices also underwent social disruption during this era. Farmers’ persistent complaints were centered on the
ability to use a patent, both in concept and in practice.53 Farmers
particularly objected to the collection of royalty fees, in part due to the
prevalence of significant fraud in the fee collection system.54 This era
of intense agrarian skepticism reached its fullest expression from
1870 through the early 1890s, as it became linked to the ideological,
institutional, and enforcement innovations of the larger Populist
movement.55
While, as recently noted by Colleen Chien,56 agrarian reformers
achieved only incremental statutory reform at a national level, such
an analysis underrates the influence such social reform may have had
on the doctrinal formation of patent law during this time. Organizationally, the Populists achieved doctrinal reform at the state level and
used innovative litigation strategies to leave a lasting mark on the
doctrinal development of patent law. For example, farmers involved
in a number of Populist organizations in Iowa, Michigan, and Indiana
funded challenges to patents associated with agricultural implements—including the barbed-wire and drive-well patents. The Supreme Court considered at least three cooperatively funded cases
during this era.57 Social disruption, thus, produced systematic change
at the judicial level.
53. EARL W. HAYTER, THE TROUBLED FARMER, 1850–1990: RURAL ADJUSTMENT TO INDUSTRIALISM 214 (1968). Hayter’s work remains the fullest examination of the
intersection of patent law and the Populist movement. His work, The Troubled
Farmer, is his summary of his early work published in historical journals. See
Earl W. Hayter, Barbed Wire Fencing—A Prairie Invention: Its Rise and Influence in the Western United States, 13 AGRIC. HIST. 189 (1939); Earl W. Hayter,
The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875–1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 59 (1947); Earl W. Hayter, The Western Farmers and the Drivewell Patent
Controversy, 16 AGRIC. HIST. 16 (1942); MURRAY, supra note 41, at 130–31
nn.14–15.
54. The Iowa Supreme Court undertook an eloquent description of these practices.
See State Bank of Indiana v. Menzer, 100 N.W. 69 (1904); MURRAY, supra note 41,
at 130 n.13.
55. The Populist movement in the United States is roughly characterized as a rural
Southern and Western coalition that coupled significant advances in organizational politics with an ideological critique of the emergence of modern industrial
markets within the United States. There has been a significant historical debate
over both its ideological content and organizational strategies. See MURRAY,
supra note 41, at 130 n.14; CHARLES POSTEL, POPULIST VISION 7–22 (2003) (outlining the major historical debate over defining the ideological content and scope of
the Populist movement).
56. Colleen Chien, Technology and Intellectual Property: Out of Sync or Hope for the
Future?, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 619, 622–25 (2013).
57. HAYTER, TROUBLED FARMER, supra note 53, at 252 (describing the efforts of farmers to join together to fund patent challenges within the context of farm implements). The Supreme Court considered these appeals in Andrews v. Hovey, 124
U.S. 694 (1888) (invalidating the patent for the method of improving artesian
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The social disruption of patents produced a popular critique of the
formal authority embodied by patents. Again, this is consistent with a
multivariate historical method, which tracks this relationship between formal and informal meaning in the law. Specifically, a popular
critique contended that patents violated a public economy of relationships between patentees, competitors, and an impacted public. This
public economy sought to achieve fairness between different economic
actors that could be integrated into “the basic institutions and local
concerns of their daily lives.”58
Improvidently granted patents and associated license practices
were perceived to violate this public economy because such practices’
existence failed to promote innovation. For example, L. Frank Baum’s
Ozma of Oz contained a pointed critique of patent law. Baum told the
story of Dorothy, who discovers a copper clockwork man with a signed
advertisement that notes, among other claims, that “all infringements
will be promptly [p]rosecuted.” Her companion (a talking hen), comments that the clockwork man would be a “wonderful machine,” but
she supposed “it is all humbug, like so many other patented articles.”59 Baum’s critique reflected the manner in which popular criticism questioned the ways formal claims of ownership by patent
owners were perceived to limit innovation within a larger economy.
Joshua Hill’s Thought and Thrift: Subjects in Every Letter of the
Alphabet For All Who Labor and Need Rest,60 a text directed toward
what Hill refers to as “those who labor,”61 contains an example of how
changes in patent law were viewed as disruptive to preexisting social
and competitive norms. Hill, in his discussion of patents, noted:
A very late instance of the bad effect of giving a long-term monopoly in the
make and use of a simple invention is the late dividend of the Bell Telephone
Company. The shares are reported to be ten dollars each, and held by rich
people; nine dollars per share was declared to their holders—being out of the
last six months’ earnings. The business communities—out of which this immense dividend at the rate of 180 per cent, annually was forced—charge it up
in turn to their customers. The question, arises, also, are these God-given
conveniences, as telegraphs, etc., as prompt, cheap, and useful as if competi-

58.

59.
60.
61.

wells because of prior public use), and The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 267 (1887)
(upholding the validity of a patent of improving artesian wells based on insufficient evidence of prior-use methods). See MURRAY, supra note 41, at 130 n.15.
See William Novak, Public Economy and the Well-Ordered Market: Law and Economic Regulation in 19th-Century America, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7 (1993) (analyzing the public economy of antebellum United States); see also Axel C.
Hüntelmann, Priority, Property, and Trust: Patent Law and Pharmaceuticals in
the German Empire, 2 INTERDISCIPLINES 194, 199 (2012) (analyzing the disruptive relationship of patent law to social norms of trust and professionalism in
nineteenth century Germany).
LYMAN FRANK BAUM, OZMA OF OZ 55–56 (1907).
JOSHUA HILL, THOUGHT AND THRIFT: SUBJECTS IN EVERY LETTER OF THE ALPHABET
FOR ALL WHO LABOR AND NEED REST 199 (1890).
Id.

2015]

CONSTITUTIONAL PATENT LAW

917

tion had never been stifled by patent rights, or as if Government owned competing lines?62

Hill’s claims reflect the ways in which patents were seen as promoting the consolidation of wealth, as well as stifling competition.
These harmful effects, according to Hill, violated the appropriate ways
in which invention worked to secure the rights of laborers and workingmen.63 Patents, under this critique, achieved other goals besides
innovation; the patent system also served goals related to equality and
labor. Thus, in many respects, the social harms for improvidently
granted patents were correspondingly more substantial.
No doubt, a multivariate historical method helps us to view constitutional principles in intellectual property law as a response to innovative and social disruption in patent law during its modern doctrinal
formation. This may be the case as well for the social-obligation principle’s reemergence in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the last
ten years. The next Part of this Article broadly considers the socialobligation principle and its role in constitutional regulation of patent
law.
III. THE SOCIAL-OBLIGATION PRINCIPLE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF PATENTS
The resurfacing of the social-obligation principle as an interpretive
norm by the Supreme Court serves as evidence of its role in the constitutional regulation of patent law. Section III.A of this Part addresses
the social-obligation principle and its relationship to constitutional
regulation of patents. Section III.B traces how the Supreme Court
gradually adopted the public-interest principle as an express socialobligation norm that was imposed on the exercise of a patent owners’
rights from 1890 until 1920. Section III.C concludes with an examination of why the social-obligation principle fell out of use as a method of
constitutional regulation in the 1920s and 1930s.
A.

The Social-Obligation Principle and the Common Law
Regulation of Patents

The social-obligation principle, grounded in the text of the IP
Clause, answered fundamental questions in the early modern patent
regime as to what the best ways were to manage the harmful impacts
that arose from innovative and social disruption. The primary vehicle
for this regulation was through a language of obligation that stressed
that the public interest could be vindicated by placing obligations on
62. Id. at 203–04.
63. Id; see also Hüntelmann, supra note 58, at 199 (analyzing the disruptive relationship of patent law to social norms of trust and professionalism in nineteenth century Germany).
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the owner to act in such a way as to best protect the public. The language of obligation served much the same purpose that the current
claims of access have served in today’s debates over the public’s relationship to patent law; that is, as a way to frame a public critique of
patents.64
The social-obligation principle assimilated the language of obligation from two key areas of the common law: contract and property law.
The language of obligation, however, differed within each doctrinal
area. Consequently, this language impacted the ways in which the
claim of obligation was assimilated into the constitutional common
law of intellectual property.
The language of obligation in contract law became the basis of a
central metaphor in patent law (i.e., the patent bargain) while the language of obligation in property law became the basis for an independent social-obligation norm in property law. Constitutional regulation
during the Progressive Era often therefore appears to be confusing because the language of obligation draws on these diverse sources. As
discussed below, it is helpful to distinguish between each area of obligation as they reflect how the Supreme Court and lower courts addressed the problem of managing the social and innovative disruption
associated with patents during this era. Notably, the strands became
woven together in the late Progressive Era, to form the basis of the
modern patent bargain.
The existence of the social-obligation principle is helpful in highlighting how common law performed a regulatory function in patent
law during the Progressive Era. In the absence of express federal regulation to the contrary, state legislatures, state and federal courts,
and ultimately the Supreme Court used the common law to regulate
the innovative and social disruption that impacted patent law during
this era. While statutory laws, such as the Patent Act of 1952, form
the core of patent regulation, recent scholarship has emphasized the
regulation of intellectual property through common law adjudication.
Common law adjudication in intellectual property systems, according
to Shyamkrishna Balganesh,65 provides for a “cautionary, contextsensitive approach to intellectual property development.”66 Furthermore, as noted by Madhavi Sunder, common law adjudication permits
intellectual property regulation to take into account “multiple theories
and values, from fairness to freedom” and thus “can give more consideration to the complex and interrelated interests of multiple parties,
64. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 810 (2008) (social movements utilize the
framing device of access in order to challenge the use of patents).
65. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2010).
66. Id. at 1546.
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from individual rights to corporate concerns to the interests of a free
and democratic society.”67 The recent revival of interest in common
law intellectual property law has typically examined how state judges
have used the common law regulation to develop the doctrines of right
of publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition.68
The usefulness of the common law, however, also extends to a constitutional common law of intellectual property law. The social-obligation principle was closely allied with state common law, but in many
ways, also represented a constitutional common law tradition that
drew inspiration from the text of the IP Clause. Its clarity as a principle was compromised, however, because its origins were muddled, as
is considered below.
B.

The Language of Obligation in the Constitutional
Regulation of Patents
1.

The Language of Obligation in Contract Law

Although the origins of the language of obligation in contract law
lay in antebellum patent doctrine that sought to provide a theoretical
basis to the modern administrative state, the Progressive Era saw a
theoretical reformation. Specifically, intellectual property theorists
began to emphasize a relationship of mutual obligation that coupled
the patentees’ obligations with the public’s corresponding
obligations.69
In his seminal treatise, Treatise on the Laws of Patents for Useful
Inventions,70 William Callahan Robinson refined the metaphor of the
patent bargain to describe the relationship of mutual obligation.71
Robinson claimed that, while the act of invention created a basic property right in the inventor,72 governmental recognition of the patent
privilege served to reward and incentivize inventors. Therefore, in exchange for this privilege, the patentee was obliged to engage in certain
67. Madhavi Sunder, Trade Secret and Human Freedom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW 350 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
68. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 67.
69. WILLIAM CALLAHAN ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, VOL. I, at 31
(1890). Robinson cites the following cases as early examples of the metaphor of
the patent bargain: Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648 (D. Mass. 1839) (No.
1518); Ames v. Howard, 1 F.Cas. 755 (D. Mass. 1833) (No. 326); Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074 (E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585).
70. Id. Robinson’s refinement of the patent metaphor can be compared to contemporary patent treatises prepared during the same era. To understand his innovative theory, compare GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS, AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED
STATES xxii–xxiv (1st. ed. 1849).
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 52–58.
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acts to effectively claim the invention.73 This insight is not particularly different from the previous characterizations of the patent bargain, but Robinson refined the metaphor of the patent bargain by
stressing that the patent holder had a duty to disclose the full content
of the patented invention through the specification and the claims.74
Robinson, thus, centered his theory on the obligation of the patent
holder.
In particular, Robinson stressed that the patent bargain involved
two acts of obligation: (1) “that the inventor, having made such an invention as is he entitled to the patent privileged must communicate it
to the public by publishing an accurate description of its character and
its uses” and (2) “that the public, having received from the inventor
this communication, must thenceforth, during the period for which it
was granted, protect him in the exclusive use of the invention so described.”75 The specified obligation of the patentee, therefore, becomes one of disclosure; Robinson continues that the obligation of the
patentee is to fully communicate the invention to the public.76 The
specified obligation of the public, by contrast, is a mere recognition of
the patentee’s exclusive right.77
Robinson’s view of mutual obligation, however, is a complex one.
On the one hand, his claim of the patentee’s obligation was an important link in developing a theory of specified constitutional harm in
patent law. Robinson intended this claim of mutual obligation to be
grounded in the language of the IP Clause. For example, Robinson
cited to Kendall v. Winsor, in which the Supreme Court specifically
invoked the IP Clause as the source of a policy norm within constitutional interpretation.78 On the other hand, the theory of mutual obligation framed the public rights as a passive act. Once the patent was
granted, the public ability to challenge it as improvidently granted
was essentially foreclosed. Obligation theory, however, heightened
the importance of examination as a central act within the patent
bargain.
The language of obligation in contract law became central to the
concept of the patent bargain. Use of the language of obligation
within contract law, however, was problematic insofar as promissory
obligations bind only those parties designed to arise out of promises
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 61.
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858) (“[T]he inventor who designedly, and
with the view of applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public, comes not within the policy or objects of the
Constitution or acts of Congress. He does not promote, and, if aided in his design,
would impede, the progress of science and the useful arts.”).
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made by parties to a given contract.79 By definition, then, the patentee owed no obligation to a generalized public, even if the patent may
have caused substantial harm to the interests of the public.
Initially, the Supreme Court attempted to address this question by
striking individual contracts between patentees and licensees as potentially unconscionable. For instance, in 1892, in Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully80 the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s
refusal to provide equitable relief of specific performance to a license
arrangement that included a number of unsatisfactory terms (for example, the patent owner bound the licensor from disputing the validity of unrelated patents and required the patentee to assist any
infringement suits as to the unrelated patents).81 The Supreme Court
noted that the license agreement was “so unique a contract”82 that
“we have found some difficulty in assigning to it its proper place
among legal obligations.”83
Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the disputed contract. While
noting that the license at issue was not unfair to the licensee,84 the
contract harmed a broader public that needed to be protected from the
existence of invalid patents.85 The Court stressed the following:
It is important to the public that competition should not be repressed by
worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should
be protected in his monopoly; and it is a serious question whether public policy
permits a man to barter away beforehand his right to defend against unjust
actions or classes of actions, though, in an individual case, he may doubtless
assent that a judgment be rendered against him, even without notice.86

This passage reveals the core tension of Pope insofar as the opinion
conflated two potential harms: the harm to the public resulting from
an improvidently granted patent and the harm of an unfair contract
that limits party autonomy. The private harm suffered by the licensee
is conflated with public harm suffered by the public. Pope is both innovative precedent in contract law and problematic precedent in patent law. In contract law, Pope is praised for its central role in the
development of the doctrine of unconscionability and for its attempts
79. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
132 (1981).
80. 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
81. Id. at 232.
82. Id. at 233.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 234 (“But, if one should agree for a valuable consideration that he would set
up no defense to any action which another might bring against him, and such
other person might enter up judgment against him in any auch [sic] action without notice, we think that no court would hesitate to pronounce such an agreement
invalid.”).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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to regulate the fairness of bargaining relationships between contracting parties.87
Until recently,88 Pope has not been studied as a patent case. In
many respects, its posture is a garden-variety contract dispute before
a state court rather than a case before the Supreme Court.89 Pope,
however, in some respects, is an important case within the doctrinal
formation of constitutional patent law. Pope is important for what it
lacks: a participatory vocabulary that rests in a theory of patent law
and its relationship to public authority. Despite its sense that the existence of potentially invalid patents may be harmful to public interests, one specific party, the licensee, suffers the actual harm.90 The
public harm, therefore, is relatively undifferentiated. Despite its theoretical limitations, Pope suggests an important procedural vehicle for
reforming the harm caused by the patentee’s actions: namely, that the
Court could refuse the equitable relief sought—specific performance—
because of the unfairness of upholding this particular contract.
It is therefore useful to the precedent of the late Progressive Era,
which actively managed to link the language of mutual obligation to a
theory of constitutional harm. A theory of mutual obligation supposed
that a constitutional harm occurred when the patentee failed to uphold the obligation to properly disclose the content of the invention.
The Supreme Court proved receptive to this characterization of
mutual obligation within patent law. For example, in Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Butte & Superior Mining Co.,91 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a lower court’s construction of a claim because
the disputed claims were indefinite and failed the written description
requirement.92 In Mineral Separation, the Court noted that when categories of patents relied heavily on the work of pioneer patents, those
patents should be “construed strictly, but candidly and fairly to give to
the patentees the full benefit, but not more, of the disclosure of their
discovery which is to become a part of the public stock of knowledge
87. See Clinton A. Stuntebeck, The Doctrine of Unconscionability, 19 ME. L. REV. 81,
81 (1967).
88. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 62–63
(2012) (discussing Pope decision within the context of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel).
89. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in this case is based on two jurisdictional
claims; its subject-matter jurisdiction over patent law and its ability to consider
claims in equity. See EDWARD PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION 52 (2000) (discussing the equitable jurisdiction during this era).
90. Subsequent case precedent that relies on Pope suggests that it served as precedent to limit the contractual obligations of patentees during the Progressive Era.
91. 250 U.S. 336 (1919); Hoe v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 141 F. 112, 117
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905) (“It is a fundamental rule that a patentee is required to point
out in his claim the exact nature of his invention, so that public can clearly know
what he claims, and can avoid infringement.”).
92. Minerals Separation, 250 U.S. at 349–50.
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upon the expiration of the patent period, and which was the consideration for the grant to them of a patent monopoly.”93 The Court also
wrote that such a requirement was consistent with the primary statutory requirements of the Patent Act of 1870, as well as previous precedent, which stressed that the core obligation of the patentee was
disclosure.94
When we compare Mineral to Pope, we see the remarkable shift in
the language of obligation during the Progressive Era. The language
of obligation in Pope is squarely within the doctrinal scope of contract
law. Mineral Separation, on the other hand, attempts to reframe the
language of mutual obligation into the contours of patent law. The
language of mutual obligation as a contract between two parties—the
patent bargain—is distinct from the language of obligation grounded
in property law. First, the patent bargain language disregards a patent as a property right. Second, the mutual obligation contained
within patent law, unlike the corresponding language of obligation in
property law, was not an accessible metaphor for public discourse on
the costs of patents. The metaphor of the patent bargain posited that
the public demands would be satisfied by the government’s intervention rather than the independent needs of the corresponding public.
In that respect, the metaphor of patent bargain dovetailed with the
institutional predilections of the interest groups of inventors, lawyers,
and regional interests that formed the core of the epistemic “patent”
community in the United States during the nineteenth century.95
2.

The Language of Obligation in Property Law
a.

Its Theoretical Origins

In many ways, property law, unlike contract law, provided a more
accessible metaphor for defining the scope of the public rights within
the modern patent regime. The language of obligation in property law
provided a way to critique patent holders for their failure to act fairly
within the public economy of patentees, competitors, and an impacted
public. Thus, the language of obligation in patent law became a way
to explore the social disruption caused by patent practices.
This language of obligation in patent law resembles a rich communitarian vocabulary in property law that places restraint upon the
claims of the property owner. Gregory Alexander and others claim
that a social-obligation norm exists in property law. At a basic level,
the social-obligation norm suggests that “property rights are inherently relational . . . [and thus] owners necessarily owe obligations to
93. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 347.
95. Morriss & Nard, supra note 34 (discussing the importance of interest groups
within the development of statutory law during the nineteenth century).
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others.”96 Thus, Gregory Alexander97 proposes that any number of
doctrines in the United States reflect a social-obligation principle,
which presupposes, in its weakest form, that property owners may not
act to harm social interests,98 and in its strongest form, that “an
owner is morally obligated to provide to the society of which the individual is a member those benefits that society reasonably regards as
necessary for human flourishing.”99 Alexander identifies a number of
property theories that reflect the social-obligation norm in U.S. property law, including eminent domain, nuisance, historic preservation,
and environmental regulations.100 Alexander posits that the socialobligation principle existed in intellectual property law within the
context of the compulsory licenses regime.101
Alexander’s search for a social-obligation principle in U.S. patent
law, however, does not have to reach so far as compulsory licensing.
Rather, the social-obligation principle in patent law incorporates the
social-obligation norm identified by Alexander into constitutional patent law. Judges gave legal meaning to the social obligation principle,
by using the language of the IP Clause that referred to the congressional responsibility to “promote the science and useful arts” to refer
broadly to the patentee’s social obligation to others.
The use of the principle depended on judicial recognition of the constitutional property tradition for its existence, while at the same time
serving as an independent critique of that tradition. Adam Mossoff
has contended that a constitutional common law tradition existed in
the late nineteenth century, which treated patents as “conceptually
equivalent” to common law property entitlements, with similar rights
of possession, use, and disposition.102 Mossoff claims that this constitutional intellectual property law drew its authority from the recognition of private property contained within the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendment.103
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Alexander, supra note 9, at 747–48.
Id. at 754–55.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775–801.
Id. at 812.
Mossoff, supra note 7, at 720–21. Conflicts over the constitutional property tradition in the late nineteenth century evolved out of use conflicts—that is, the patent owner’s affirmative right to use the patent and to prevent others from using
that patent. The claim that the patentee had an affirmative right to use derived
both from a standardized claim that common law patent included the affirmative
right to use and its narrower statutory embodiment in Section 22 of the Patent
Act of 1870, which stated that a patent grant permitted “the patentee, his heirs
or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use and
vend the said invention or discovery throughout the United States.” Patent Act
of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 202.
103. Mossof, supra note 7, at 696.
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The claim that a patent is constitutional property that qualifies for
compensation under the Fifth Amendment has been a controversial
one. The debate presents a binary choice: one agrees that a patent is
type of property and therefore subject to minimal regulation, the other
that the patent is a monopoly and therefore subject to extensive regulation.104 The existence of the social-obligation principle, however,
suggests a more complex view of regulation within the constitutional
property tradition. The language of obligation recognizes that, while a
patent may exist as a type of constitutional property, such recognition
does not necessarily preclude that a patent—like any other type of
property—may be regulated so as to restrain its impact on others.
Specifically, judicial use of the social-obligation principle stressed
that even if a patent may exist as a type of constitutional property, it
did not necessarily preclude the possiblity that a patent, like any
other type of property, could be restrained if the use of the patent
could cause innovative or social disruption. As discussed below, the
social-obligation principle emerged into two phases: initial innovation
at the state level to restrain licensing and use practice, and the controversial response at the federal appellate level.
b.

The Social-Obligation Principle and State Regulation

Reconstructing patent doctrine as a response to social and innovative disruption reveals the importance of state common law in forming
the basic foundations of patent regulation. A social-obligation principle in patent law emerged as a result of judicial and legislative innovation in the Midwest in response to the pressure exerted by statelevel populists. Earl Hayter identified three primary problems for social movements such as populism: (1) the ability of “patent rings” to
purchase what were termed “bottom” patents, and to extend their life
indefinitely through reissue or congressional fiat;105 (2) the existence
of interlocking patents on a number of different products;106 and (3)
the ability of the patentee to sue multiple downstream users on licensed patented products.107
104. See, e.g., Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern
Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to
Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (arguing that Congress provides patent
rights solely “because it has concluded that the benefits of exclusivity outweigh
the harm done from forcing society to endure monopoly profits. As a result, a
patent is like any other federally granted benefit, and therefore legislative
change that diminishes its value does not trigger the right to Takings Clause
compensation.”).
105. HAYTER, THE TROUBLED FARMER, supra note 53, at 213.
106. Id. at 214.
107. Id. at 215.
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Between 1870 and 1890, at least 14 state legislatures, including
Indiana,108 Ohio,109 Pennsylvania,110 New York,111 Arkansas,112
Tennessee,113 Minnesota,114 Wisconsin,115 Iowa,116 Nebraska,117 and
Kansas,118 attempted to control these practices by requiring patentees, assignees, and peddlers to either acquire a license for sale of the
patented product or register the patent itself in the local land registry.
Kansas’ 1889 regulation offers an example of these statutes. Section
167 made it “unlawful for any person to sell or barter or offer to sell or
barter any patent right, or any right which such person shall allege to
be a patent right, in any county within this state without first filing
with the clerk of the district court of such county copies of the latter
patents duly authenticated.”119
These acts deliberately treated patents as property, an apparent
victory for those who would claim that patents are property. This
treatment, however, was not to empower patent owners but to limit
patent owners by permitting local and state entities to exercise police
power over the sale and license of patented products. Again, this suggests that we have to treat property discourse within patent law with
care insofar as the claim that a patent is property does not preclude
myriad regulations to limit its boundaries.
From 1890 until 1905, at least twelve state high courts considered
the ability of state legislatures to regulate the patents through this
type of statute.120 A typical case upheld the legislatures’ ability to
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

IND. CODE. Ch. 92 § 6054 (1881).
Ohio, 66 O.L. 93 (1889); OHIO REV. CODE. § 53 (1877).
Act of April 12, 1872, P.L. 60 §§ 1–2 (1872).
N.Y. STAT. Ch. 65 § 2 (1877).
Arkansas, Sand. & H. Dig. § 493–96.
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 576 (1884).
MINN. STAT. §§137(1)–139(3) (1871).
WIS. STAT. §1573 (1870), amended by WIS. STAT. §1570 (1889).
IOWA CODE § 1 (1876).
NEB. REV. STAT. Ch. 53 §§ 1–2, 5 (1873).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 167 (1889).
Id.
Including Kansas as referenced above, at least twelve states upheld these categories of regulations. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Wallace, 55 S.W. 1105, 1107 (Ark. 1900)
(“This act is plain and emphatic. The note sued on in this case was void for noncompliance with section 493 of the statute quoted above. The note could not be
the basis of recovery in this suit. As an evidence of indebtedness, it was void,
under section 493. The judgment is affirmed.”); Brechbill v. Randall, 1 N.E. 362
(Ind. 1885) (“In our opinion the statute is valid, for the reason that in enacting it
the legislature exercised a police power resident in the state. The power to make
police regulations for the protection of its citizens against fraud and imposition is
not taken from the states by the federal constitution, or by any national statute.
It has, indeed been authoritatively settled that the national legislature cannot
exercise police powers for the protection of the inhabitants of a state. This is a
domestic matter, to be governed and regulated by state law.”); Tod v. Wick Bros.
& Co., 36 Ohio St. 370, 377 (1881) (“If the legislature may, and does undertake
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regulate patents as property under states’ police powers as derived
from the Tenth Amendment.121 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court advanced the fullest articulation of the state’s police power to
regulate patentee behavior in In re Opinion of the Justices.122 This
restrictions upon negotiability to this extent, then the use of such paper in terms
negotiable must tend to defraud the rights of some one, either that of the maker
or that of the indorsee [sic], and this may be met by prohibitions and penalties.
That such power exists somewhere cannot be denied. That it exists in our legislature, in the absence of positive restriction upon it, is equally clear.”); Haskell v.
Jones, 86 Pa. 173 (1878) (“All who take with notice of the consideration, take
necessarily subject to the same defence. There is nothing in all this which interferes with any just right of the holder of a valid patent under the Acts of Congress, nor that the maker of the note shall be permitted to show against a holder
with such notice that it was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation. This very
plainly distinguishes our act from the statutes of other states, which have been
held unconstitutional.”); State v. Cook, 64 S.W. 720, 722 (Tenn. 1901) (“These
statutes are also sustainable as valid police regulations, having been passed in
good faith for the real promotion of the public welfare, and being well calculated
to accomplish that end through the fair and much needed protection thereby afforded against imposition and fraud, so often and so easily perpetrated in the sale
of the peculiar incorporeal right, or intangible property, contemplated.”). At least
five states did not uphold these regulations. See Hollida & Ball v. Hunt, 70 Ill.
109, 113 (1873) (“The right to vend, guaranteed by the general government to
patentees, is to traffic and sell with the same freedom that may be exercised in
regard to any and all other property, according to the common and usual course of
trade and business, and whatever tends to prevent this, necessarily tends, to that
extent, to destroy the right granted.”); Cranson v. Smith, 37 Mich. 309, 311–12
(1877) (“The subject of granting patents and regulating the rights of patentees
has been placed by the Constitution of the United States in the control of Congress. It is for that body alone to determine to whom and on what conditions they
shall be granted and how the patented privileges are to be transferred or disposed of. Where any right or privilege is subject to the regulation of Congress it
is not competent for State laws to impose conditions which shall interfere with
the rights or diminish their value. In those cases where the congressional power
is lawfully exercised, it is supreme. In the absence of any policy to the contrary
the transfer of such rights may follow, as it usually does, the State rules applicable to similar property, as to sales or inheritances. But any attempt to discriminate against it is a direct invasion of the authority of the United States, and is
invalid.”); Wilch v. Phelps, 14 Neb. 134, 15 N.W. 361, 362 (1883) (“From an examination of the authorities it seems to have been quite uniformly held, not only by
the courts of the United States but by those of the several states as well, that this
provision has the effect of prohibiting the enactment of state statutes affecting
injuriously the assignment or transfer of rights secured by letters patent, or the
sale of patented articles. That the interest or privilege given and secured by a
patent is a property right admits of no doubt. Being a property right, the patentee is protected in its enjoyment by the paramount law.”); State v. Lockwood, 43
Wis. 403 (1877) (“It is not improper, however, to say that if the validity of ch. 140
of 1872 were properly before it, this court would be very much disposed to follow
the ruling of the surpreme [sic] court of Michigan in Cranson v. Smith, 5 Cent. L.
J., 386, and hold the statute to be an invasion of federal authority, and therefore
void.”).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
122. 81 N.E. 142, 147 (Mass. 1907).

928

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:901

opinion, issued by the Court on request of the legislature, held that a
statute proposed before the Massachusetts legislature, which sought
to regulate conditional licenses on farming implements, was a proper
exercise of state power under the Tenth Amendment. The Court held
that the legislature’s exercise was appropriate, stating:
[T]he patentee’s right is a monopoly in the invention; but it does not protect
from state legislation any monopoly in other commercial ventures which the
owner of the patent may attempt to establish or maintain. But such legislation as that of which we are speaking could have no further operation than to
prevent the holder of such a monopoly (which is beyond the control of the Legislature) from extending his power to the creation of other and further monopolies which have not been granted to him by any federal authority, and which
we think that the Legislature under its general authority has the power to
prohibit. The federal government cannot exercise the police power for the protection of the inhabitants of a state.123

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas in Mason v. MacLeod124 asserted that the ability to regulate patents derived from its ability to
“police regulations for the protections and security of its citizens, and
that regulations like ours, which are mainly designed to protect the
people from imposition by those who have actually no authority to sell
patent rights, or own patent rights to sell, should be upheld.”125
McLeod is representative insofar as it reflects the ways in which
the emerging social obligation principle served radical ends during the
Progressive Era. The existence of the social-obligation principle recognized that while the patent owner had property claims, those claims
were embedded within a network of obligations to specific communities. It is no coincidence that state and local governments originated
initial regulation of patents based on obligation. In many respects, it
suggests property doctrines served what Gary Berk identifies126 as a
syncretic function that served to assimilate popular concerns over patents into a preexisting regulatory framework. Thus while the language of property law appears to be inherently conservative, here the
vocabulary of obligation served radical ends insofar as it helped a
range of actors assimilate the consequences of innovative and social
disruption in patent practice within preexisting doctrine.
The Supreme Court permitted the continued existence of this diverse state regulation. In Allen v. Riley,127 the Supreme Court held
that states enjoyed independent police power under the Tenth Amendment to regulate patents as property, concluding that “[t]he state has
the power (certainly until Congress legislates upon the subject) with
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
45 P. 76, 77 (Kan. 1896).
Id. at 77.
This conception of the syncretic public interest draws on the notion of creative
syncretism examined by Gary Berk in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF
REGULATED COMPETITION 1900–1932, at 15 (2009).
127. 203 U.S. 347 (1906).
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regard to the provision which shall accompany the sale or assignment
of rights arising under a patent, to make reasonable regulations concerning the subject, calculated to protect its citizens from fraud.”128
Allen thus, recognized the ways in which the language of obligation
became incorporated into state regulation as a means to respond to
the social disruption caused during the Progressive Era.
Allen, by upholding state claims based on asserted police powers
under the Tenth Amendment, interpreted the IP Clause within its relationship to enumerated rights contained in the Bill of Rights. Ultimately, however, Allen demonstrated the limits of using state law as
the primary basis for imposing obligations on the patent holder. State
laws disrupted the centrality of the IP Clause as the primary constitutional vehicle for resolving disputes over patentee practices in two
ways. First, Allen attempted to create a corollary state control over
patent law that resembled the significant state control over antitrust
development during the same era.129 This ultimately proved unsuccessful, however, as Allen has not typically been used in subsequent
cases pertaining to states’ authority to regulate intellectual property.130 Second, Allen also speaks to limits of imposing social-obligation norms through state regulation. Because the goals of the socialobligation principle were largely communitarian, such regulation appeared to be diffuse in light of the ideological weight associated with
the inventor’s claim. State regulation thus proved to be a rather indirect way to solve the social harms caused by the actions of a patentee.
c.

The Social-Obligation Principle as Constitutional SocialObligation Norm

State regulation of patents through a social-obligation principle did
not depend on the IP Clause. Rather, such regulation relied on a
state’s ability to regulate property as an element of its police powers
under the Tenth Amendment. By contrast, the social-obligation principle grounded its theory of regulation in the words of the IP Clause
itself. The use of the text of the IP Clause was not organic, but rather
emerged within the jurisprudence over a period of thirty years, from
roughly 1890 until 1920. Four cases—one appellate court holding,
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. (The
Button-Fastener Case),131 and three Supreme Court cases, Continen128. Id. at 355.
129. See, e.g., James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U.
PENN. L. REV. 495 (1987) (examining the relationship of state experimentation in
the area of antitrust law and the constitutional response).
130. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
131. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
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tal Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,132 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.
(A.B. Dick),133 and the reversal of A.B. Dick in Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,134—represent the evolving
debate over the existence of this doctrine.
These cases are typically considered to be within the scope of the
patent misuse doctrine, which holds a patent unenforceable when the
patentee engages in unjust behavior in order to maintain the patent.135 Commentary on these cases stresses their anomalous nature,
as they fit neither the goals of antitrust law nor patent law.136 These
doctrines achieve coherence, however, if understood as an ongoing
struggle to control the behavior of the patentee by imposing a constitutional social-obligation norm.
The earliest of these cases, The Button-Fastener Case,137 is a seminal case in how to regulate by imposing a social responsibility on the
patent holder. The procedural history of The Button Fastener case offers two perspectives on how to manage this social and innovative disruption through the lens of a social obligation norm. Significant
disagreement existed between the district court and the appellate
court over how to weigh the patentee’s property right against the patentee’s obligations to others.
The district court below held that the patentee could not place conditions of use on subsequent licensees.138 It stressed that such conditional licenses should be disfavored in light of their impact on a
multiplicity of users, as well as the ability of such licenses to diminish
the public domain.139 In doing so, the district court commented:
[I] am persuaded that the patentee’s privilege has its limitations, in the rights
and interests of the public, and that it is an abuse of his privilege to so shape
his dealings with his patent as to secure a monopoly upon an unpatented article. It is hard to foresee to what extent such schemes might be carried, if
patents can practically be broadened so as to gather in a multitude of subjects
132.
133.
134.
135.

136.
137.

138.
139.

210 U.S. 405 (1908).
224 U.S. 1 (1912).
243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
The defense of patent misuse focuses primarily on the patentee’s behavior in expanding the scope of its rights beyond the statutory patent grant. A patent owner
has misused his patent if he has “impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of patent grant with anti-competitive effect.” Windsurfing Int’l v.
AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 476 (2011).
77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). The license at issue stated the following: “This machine
is sold and purchased to use only with fasteners made by the Peninsular Novelty
Company, to whom the title to said machine immediately reverts upon violation
of this contract of sale.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 65 F. 619,
621–22 (C.C.D. Mich. 1895), rev’d, 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
Id.
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now and always hitherto free from monopoly. The perversion is complete in
the instance of the present case.”140

The district court’s language reflected two themes that mark the
emergence of the social-obligation principle. First, the district court
proposed a reciprocal relationship between the patentee’s rights and
the “rights and interests” of the public.141 The constitutional norm of
the social-obligation principle grounds the “rights and interests” of the
public in the language of the IP Clause. Second, the district court insinuated that licensed patents disrupt moral relationships between
the patentee, competitors, and consumers that are central to a functional economy. The opinion was threaded through with language of
morality, stressing terms such as abuse, free and perversion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“the Sixth Circuit”)
reversed the district court and held that that patentee could condition
the sale of a patented machine on the use of an unpatented item and,
therefore, an infringing act occurred when a licensor used the patented machine without the patented item.142 The Sixth Circuit’s holding in The Button-Fastener Case demonstrated the basic elements of
the constitutional property tradition. In a majority opinion authored
by then-Judge Horace Lurton, the court emphasized that the grant of
a patent is a “true and absolute monopoly” that exists in “derogation of
the common right,” and thus “this right to monopolize the use of the
invention or discovery is the substantial property right conferred by
law, and which the public is under obligation to respect and
protect.”143
The court, however, then stressed that the property right of the
patent holder could be subjected to regulation because:
The property right of a patentee is, after all, but a property right, and subject,
as is all other property, to the general law of the land. We may also concede
that contracts respecting the use of inventions and discoveries are, like all
other contracts, subject to the limitations imposed by definite principles of
public policy.144

This passage in The Button-Fastener Case is revealing in two ways.
First, the Sixth Circuit would restrict a patent under those circumstances in which, for instance, a conditional license operated in a manner similar to a “common carrier” such as a telephone company,145 or
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 621.
Id.
The Button-Fastener Case, 77 F. at 290.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293 (citing Missouri v. Bell Tel. Co., 23 F. 539, 541 (C.C.D. Mo. 1885)) (“So,
my conclusion is that, notwithstanding the terms of this license, which seem to
inhibit it from dealing or giving its telephonic privileges to any other telegraph
company than the Western Union, the moment it established its telephonic system here, that moment it compelled itself to respond to the demands of any tele-
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when a patent causes harm to a user.146 Second, the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion also emphasized a theory of obligation grounded in contract
law, exposing the ways in which the two strands of obligation could
exist simultaneously during the Progressive Era.
The dialogue between the two courts in The Button-Fastener Case
reveals the complex theories of regulation at play within the constitutional property tradition. The district court adopted a far more radical
critique of patent regulation, one that was vested in claiming a rightsbased regulation of patents, while the Sixth Circuit advanced a more
conservative claim that patents would be regulated within “public policy” limits similar to the “common carrier” exception to trespass
claims in property.147
The basic doctrinal framework Judge Lurton outlined in The Button-Fastener Case, a strong property right within a constrained—but
not necessarily enervated148—regulation of the property right, proved
to be influential. Judge Lurton, later appointed to the Supreme Court,
authored A.B. Dick. Judge Lurton’s majority opinion in The ButtonFastener Case formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bement v. National Harrow Co.,149 where the Court held that a patent
owner did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act if the patent owner
imposed reasonable conditions of the manufacture and sale of a patented item.150
The Button-Fastener Case also influenced Continental Paper Bag
Co., in which the Court held that the patentee had the exclusive right
“not to use” the patent, even if such nonuse had the incidental effect of
suppressing a competitive market.151 In Continental Bag, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the First Circuit.152 Continental
Bag is a standard opinion within the constitutional property tradition.

146.
147.
148.
149.

150.
151.
152.

graph company or any individual in the city tendering to it equal pay for equal
privileges.”).
Id. at 293–94.
Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303–12 (1996) (examining the regulatory responsibilities of common carriers).
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, at ix (1996).
186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“Notwithstanding these exceptions, the general rule is
absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United
States. The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to
this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for
the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts.
The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices
does not render them illegal.”).
Id. at 93.
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 432–34 (1908).
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741 (1st Cir. Me. 1906), aff’d,
210 U.S. 405.
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However, the dissenting opinion, authored by district court Judge Edgar Aldrich, is remarkable as it marked the first time the IP Clause
was used to support a social-obligation principle.
Judge Aldrich153 initially treated a patent as equivalent to real
property.154 Judge Aldrich, however, contended that the nonuse of a
patent violated the IP Clause. According to Judge Aldrich, the constitutional purpose of patents was not simply to encourage the individual
property owner, but also to “encourage invention in the interests of
general business and of the public,”155 and that nonuse of a patent
violated that constitutional purpose.156 Judge Aldrich interpreted the
terms of the IP Clause “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts” as a limiting principle, insofar as the phrase suggested that the
Constitution “intended to stimulate art and invention under competitive conditions.”157 Judge Aldrich contended that nonuse of patents
violated the public interest by stifling competition, “forc[ing] trade
into unnatural channels,” and thus, “offend[ed] public policy, the conscience of equity and the spirit and intention of the law upon which
the legal right is founded.”158 Judge Aldrich’s opinion marks the true
emergence of the social-obligation norm in constitutional property
law: a theoretical corollary of the common law conception of property
grounded in the text of the IP Clause.
C.

The Modern Patent Bargain: Synthesizing the SocialObligation Principle

The utility of this social-obligation principle became a contested element in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the ten years following the Continental Bag decision. The two doctrinal lineages,
contract and property law, merged into the metaphor of the patent
bargain. The Supreme Court began to tie the claims embodied in the
social-obligation principle into the statutory regime of patent law
rather than the constitutional common law regime. Thus, the existing
obligations of the patent owner were to be defined in light of their
statutory responsibilities to disclose the content of the patent and associated invention. This was a departure rather than more subjective
expectations of obligation that formed the previous jurisprudence.
The assimilation of the social-obligation principle into the metaphor of the patent bargain depended on two events. First, the constitutional patent tradition came under attack after the Supreme Court’s
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 752 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
at 755.
at 745.
at 746.
at 745.
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decision in A.B. Dick Co. in 1912.159 Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence came to emphasize the centrality of statutory law in patent law
at the expense of constitutional common law. A synthesized socialobligation principle emerged in response to these events in Motion
Picture Patents Co.160
A.B. Dick is a liminal case within the constitutional patent tradition, illuminating its particular power as a set of legal doctrines, but
foreshadowing its end. In A.B. Dick, the Supreme Court held that a
patent owner, acting within his unreserved right to “use,” could tie a
patent to an unpatented article by a license on the patent that required the use of an unpatented article. The Court concluded that the
act of selling a patented item without the unpatented item was, therefore, an act of contributory infringement.161
The Supreme Court then proceeded to reject the holding of A.B.
Dick.162 A year later, in 1913, the Court in Bauer & Cie v.
O’Donnell163 examined whether to uphold a license that dictated a set
price to a patented good. The Supreme Court distinguished A.B. Dick,
claiming that such a license implicated the right to “vend” a patent
rather than the right to “use” a patent.164 By 1917, in Motion Picture
Patents Co.,165 the Supreme Court overruled A.B. Dick, holding that a
patentee could not utilize a license to limit subsequent users’ use of
the patented good by requiring that those purchasers use an unpatented good with the patented good.166
The majority opinion of A.B. Dick is squarely within the constitutional patent tradition. The Supreme Court noted that a finding of
contributory infringement was necessary because tying cases implicated the common law use rights of the patent owner. Such use rights
included the “property rights in the materials composing a patented
machine” and the broader “right to use . . . for the purpose and manner pointed out by the patent.”167 Thus, the Court maintained, the
patentee’s broad use right allows her to limit the use rights of the associated machines. Justice Lurton concluded that “[t]he property
right to a patented machine may pass to a purchaser with no right to
use, or with only the right to use in a specified way, or at a specified
place, or at specified purpose.”168
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917).
A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. at 49.
See Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 627 (2008) (briefly
reviewing the events that led to the reversal of A.B. Dick).
229 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1913).
Id. at 17.
Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 518.
Id.
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 1 (1912).
Id. at 24.
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A.B. Dick was not an unusual case within the constitutional patent
tradition. Nevertheless, it prompted a furious reaction. Justice Edward Douglas White, author of the dissent, challenged the majority in
two ways. First, the dissent claimed that the majority’s conception of
a “use” right would cause social disruption since the patent owner
would be able to limit the behavior of a “multitude of people”169 by
linking use of a patent to “ordinary commodity of general use.”170
Such power, explained Justice White, would “make the virtual legislative authority of the owner of a patented machine extend to every
human being in society,” a power that seemed outside of contractual
privity.171 The dissent thus focused the failure of common law regulation to fully address the complex ways in which consumers in a modern economy consumed products. Moreover, the dissent claimed that
tying licenses undermined the public purposes of a patent because
these licenses lacked the public authority of the patent itself.172 The
dissent in A.B. Dick prefigured the Supreme Court’s approach in Motion Pictures by emphasizing how common law regulation of patents
was insufficient insofar as it was not linked to the statutory authority
imposed by Congress.
A.B. Dick also prompted significant academic, judicial, and legislative reaction. A representative example of legal commentary, noted in
1914 that:
The principles of the Mimeograph Case were settled long ago . . . . The only
reason why the rule so clearly stated in the Button Fastener Case . . . has been
attacked in vigorous terms by a dissenting minority of the Supreme Court is
because there is a quickened public conscience which manifested itself in judicial discretion in the Selden Case to stop unmoral monopoly by abuse of the
patent monopoly, and which would extend that power unduly.173

Lower courts also moved swiftly to reconsider the impact of the
case.174
Likewise, Congress intervened through the introduction of H.R.
23417 (the “Oldfield Bill”) in the U.S. House of Representatives, by
William Oldfield of Arkansas, chairman of the House Committee on
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 50 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 54 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he power to issue a patent is made to depend
upon considerations of the novelty and utility of the invention[ ] and the presence
of these prerequisites must be ascertained and sanctioned by public authority.”)
173. William Macomber, Judicial Discretion in Patent Cases, 24 YALE L. J. 99, 102
(1914) (citation omitted).
174. The Supreme Court’s ruling was not the only critical assessment of A.B. Dick.
Lower courts also attempted to limit the consequences of A.B. Dick. See, e.g.,
Ford Motor Co., v. Union Motor Sales Co., 225 F. 373, 375 (S.D. Ohio 1914) (contending that the holding of A.B. Dick only applied in those cases where the patent
owner was acting as a licensee rather than a manufacturer). Academic reaction
to A.B. Dick was also critical. See, e.g., Note, Control of Patentee over Unpatented
Commodities, 25 HARVARD L. REV. 641, 642–43 (1912).
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Patents (Committee).175 The Oldfield Bill contained two key provisions. Section 17 of the Oldfield Bill provided that if after the first
four years of the patent, the patented invention was not manufactured, the owner had to provide a compulsory license to the patented
invention upon demand. If the patent owner refused to provide a compulsory license, the person seeking the license could apply to a district
court for a grant of the patent.176 Section 32 permitted any person
who purchased from the owner of a patent any machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, to use the purchased object without conditions, and prevented the patentee from imposing any condition related
to the patented invention.177
Attesting to the significant controversy over Oldfield Bill, the Committee conducted twenty-seven days of testimony on its contents.178
The rhetoric surrounding consideration of the bill reflected theoretical
disagreement over the best way to regulate patents. For example, Gilbert Herbert Montague, an experienced patent practitioner, defended
the constitutional patent tradition.179 Montague claimed that intellectual property (what he termed “brain property”) enjoyed the same
status as tangible property, and thus “the inventor could use or suppress or dispose of the results of his inventive thought as freely and as
absolutely as the worker of tangible things could use, or suppress, or
dispose of the results of his creative labor.”180 By contrast, Chairman
Oldfield, a noted Populist, emphasized the older norms of the public
economy. He stressed that licenses should be regulated in ways that
led to fairness in the marketplace, claiming:
the method of maintaining prices does not permit the public to have anything
to do with the making of the contract between the public and the merchant,
but the manufacturer and the retailer have everything to do with it and every-

175. H.R. 23417, 62d Cong. §§ 1–51 (1912). William Oldfield introduced the bill on
April 16, 1912. An amended version of the bill was introduced on August 8, 1912.
176. Id. § 17.
177. Id. § 32.
178. The twenty-seven hearings are collected in WILLIAM ALLEN OLDFIELD, OLDFIELD
REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE PATENT STATUTES: HEARINGS BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE (1912).
179. See, e.g., Gilbert H. Montague, Patent System Defended in Congress, 25 GREEN
BAG 178 (1913); Gilbert H. Montague, The Bogey of the “Patent Monopoly,” 42
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 251 (1912); Gilbert H. Montague, The Proposed Patent Law Amendments, 24 GREEN BAG 337 (1912); Gilbert H. Montague,
The Proposed Patent Law Revision, 26 HARV. L. REV. 128 (1912); Gilbert H. Montague, Judge’s Views on Brain Property, Wrong, N. Y. TIMES, September 13, 1912,
at 8. See also Wyatt Wells, Counterpoint to Reform: Gilbert H. Montague and the
Business of Regulation, 78 BUS. HIST. REV. 423 (2004) (examining Gilbert H.
Montague’s career).
180. Gilbert H. Montague, The Spirit of the American Patent System, 196 N. AM. REV.
682, 687 (1912).
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thing to say as to what is a reasonable profit. Is that a fair or wholesome way
of doing things?181

Finally, Louis Brandeis, a central figure in progressive thought during
this era,182 contended that the type of regulatory issues at the heart of
A.B. Dick could not be resolved within the scope of patent law itself.
Rather, Brandeis suggested that legal regimes external to patent law,
such as antitrust law, should be the vehicle of regulating tying
licenses.183
Given the apparent limits of the constitutional patent tradition,
the Supreme Court subsequently grappled with the best manner to
regulate patents, whether to regulate intellectual property law
through the common law of intellectual property regulation or
whether through statutory authority. The Supreme Court in Bauer &
Cie v. O’Donnell184 refused to uphold a license that dictated a set price
to a patented good, notwithstanding the dissent of Justice Lurton,
among others. The Supreme Court distinguished A.B. Dick, claiming
that such a license implicated the right to “vend” a patent rather than
the right to “use” a patent under Section 4952 of the Patent Act of
1870.185
The majority opinion of Bauer relied on the legal reasoning of an
earlier case, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, which rejected the constitutional patent tradition.186 In Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme Court
claimed that the copyright owner could not limit the resale of a book
under the relevant copyright authority.187 The Court utilized the text
of the IP Clause in two ways. First, the Court claimed that, unlike a
patent, a copyright was a kind of regulatory property and thus de181. Oldfield Revision and Codification of the Patent Statutes: 19th Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, 62d Cong. 9 (1912) (statement by of Congressman William
Oldfield, chairman).
182. The centrality of Louis Brandeis is well recognized within the relevant legal literature. See e.g., EDWARD PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 116–91 (2000) (analyzing the constitutional jurisprudence of Brandeis within the context of the expansion of federal jurisdiction in
Erie); Phillip Cullis, The Limits of Progressivism: Louis Brandeis, Democracy and
the Corporation, 30 J. AM. STUDIES 381–404 (1996) (analyzing Brandeis’ influence
on discussion of trusts within the Progressive era); see generally MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION (1981) (outlining the broad
contours of Brandeis’ relationship to the Progressive movement).
183. Oldfield Revision and Codification of the Patent Statutes: 18th Hearing Before the
Comm. on Patents, 62nd Cong. 9 (May 15, 1912) (statement of Louis D. Brandeis)
(“But what I suggest that this committee should do is, having investigated this
question from the patent end, report to the House that what is needed is not a
law dealing specifically and in this limited way with patents, but dealing broadly
with the situation, which is going to cover not only patents, but all articles.”).
184. 229 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1913).
185. Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198, § 4952.
186. Bauer, 229 U.S. at 12 (citing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)).
187. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. 339.

938

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:901

pended “upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in
pursuance of the authority conferred under [the IP Clause]: ‘[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited
times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.’ ”188 Second, the IP Clause formed the basis
for congressional authority to limit any common law rights that might
have been enjoyed by the patent owner to sell their copyrighted material. Thus, the IP Clause formed the basis for congressional authority
to limit the common law prerogatives. The Court noted:
[T]he copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed, with a view to effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to be unduly extended by judicial construction to include privileges not intended to be
conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant.189

Thus, the Court concluded that the copyright owner could not limit
the resale of a copyright item because the Copyright Act implicated
the right to vend a copyrighted item and would extend beyond the limits of the statutory property right.190
Bauer and Bobbs-Merrill follow similar paths in their approach to
the constitutional patent tradition. In both Bauer and Bobbs-Merrill,
the Supreme Court once again referred to the text of the IP Clause to
claim that the property rights of the patent owner should be defined
only in relationship to the relevant statutory grant,191 and once again
stated that the text of the IP Clause suggested that “care should be
taken not to extend by judicial construction the rights and privileges
which it was the purpose of Congress to bestow.”192 Bobbs-Merrill
and Bauer, thus, suggest how the assimilation of the social-obligation
principle into the metaphor of the patent bargain occurred. While
Bauer and Bobbs-Merill used the text of the IP Clause to support the
claim of patent holder to a property right, both cases placed statutory
law, rather than common law, at the center of doctrinal formation in
patent law.
Motion Picture Patents193 further reflects the synthesis of the doctrinal strands of obligation in the modern patent bargain. In Motion
Picture Patents, the Supreme Court overturned A.B. Dick and held
that a patent owner could not mandate that a patented item (here a
motion picture projector) be “tied” to the use of a nonpatented item
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Bauer, 229 U.S. at 10 (“The text of IP Clause for the purpose of encouraging useful invention and promoting new and useful improvements by the protection and
stimulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was intended to secure to the
public, after the lapse of the exclusive privileges granted, the benefit of such inventions and improvements.”).
192. Id.
193. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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through a license arrangement.194 The Court used a synthesized social-obligation principle as the explicit constitutional norm in interpreting the scope of Section 4884 of the Patent Act of 1870, which in
key terms provided, “every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the
patentee . . . of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention
or discovery throughout the United States.”195 Initially, the Court
stressed that three rules existed that would be used “to interpret the
language of the statute.”196 First, “the scope of every patent is limited
to the invention described in the claims contained in it, read in the
light of the specification.”197 Second, “patent law simply protects him
in the monopoly of that which he has invented and has described in
the claims of his patent.198 The Court emphasized that “since Pennock v. Dialogue . . . was decided in 1829, this [C]ourt has consistently
held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of
private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.’ ”199 Using these principles, the
Court explicitly rejected the ability of the patentee to tie patented
products through conditional licenses because that practice was
outside of the statutory ability to “use” and “vend” a patent.200
Motion Pictures is a seminal case in the doctrinal formation of the
metaphor of the patent bargain. Initially, Motion Pictures explicitly
rejected the constitutional patent tradition. In his dissent, Justice
Holmes stated that “[I] suppose that a patentee has no less property in
his patented machine than any other owner.”201 Justice Holmes
maintained that the majority had improperly rejected the inherent
right to use that had accrued in patent ownership and acted in a manner that was inconsistent with previous cases, such as Continental
Bag, which indicated that a patent holder could withhold its patent
from use by others.202
Motion Pictures thus marked the clear distinction between the constitutional patent tradition and the modern patent regime. Motion
Pictures, however, synthesized the primary strands of the social-obligation principle during the Progressive Era. First, Motion Pictures explicitly utilized the text of the IP Clause to interpret the statutory
meaning of a patent statute. This resembled Judge Aldrich’s dissent
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 517–18.
Id. at 512 (citing § 4884, Patent Act of 1870) (emphasis added).
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“[T]he patentee receives nothing from the law which he did not have before,
and that the only effect of his patent is to restrain others from manufacturing,
using, or selling that which he has invented.”).
200. Id. at 510–11.
201. Id. at 421 (Holmes, J, dissenting).
202. Id. at 422.
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in Continental Bag, which used the text of the IP Clause to support a
reading of the common law constitutional patent tradition. Second,
Motion Pictures explicitly adopted the doctrinal strand of obligation
from contract law. The metaphorical patent bargain as described in
Motion Pictures is paid homage in Robinson’s concept of mutual obligation: the patentee has an obligation to disclose the contents of the
patented invention and the government has the obligation to grant a
properly disclosed patented invention.
Thus, the metaphor of patent bargain does depend on a notion of
obligation. The patentee’s obligation, however, is grounded in the responsibility to disclose the contents of the patented invention rather
than broad fairness concerns that characterized the social-obligation
norm within the constitutional patent tradition. The metaphor of the
patent bargain, therefore, adopts a narrower claim than the socialobligation principle within the constitutional patent tradition, which
grounded its language of obligation within the fairness of the patent’s
actions against other users. Despite this narrowness, the metaphor of
the patent bargain is shaped by its commitment to casting the public’s
claim as resulting from the obligations that are to be placed on the
patent holder. Thus, in many respects, it is still explicitly a conservative way of articulating the public interests that inhere in a patent.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY IN THE FORMATION
OF MODERN PATENT LAW
Tracking the many permutations of the social-obligation principle
also provides a framework for the modern patent regime. Its utility
extends to current patent practice today. Tracing its existence helps
us to recognize what I term constitutional complexity in the modern
patent regime.
Constitutional complexity recognizes that the judicial crafting of
intellectual property law occurs not simply within a narrow epistemic
community of intellectual property practitioners, but also simultaneously within a broader constitutional discourse and practice. Section
IV.A of this Part outlines the primary practical effects of constitutional complexity, including the ongoing use of constitutional norms as
well as the importance of doctrinal lineages in understanding the development of patent law. Section IV.B outlines the theoretical consequences of constitutional complexity, with a particular focus on the
institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court in modern patent law.
A.

Constitutional Complexity and Practical Effect in
Modern Patent Law

The task of recognizing constitutional complexity permits some
speculation as to the practical effects of this complexity—however ten-
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tative—within the doctrinal formation of patent law. Two primary
conclusions can be drawn.
First, it is important to simply recognize that debates over the text
of the IP Clause need to acknowledge the ways in which the clause is
used within constitutional discourse. For example, consider the famous language contained in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City203:
At the outset, it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems
from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress ‘[t]o
promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.’ The clause is
both a grant of power and a limitation.204

Graham’s language referring to “grant” is easily understood to refer to
congressional authority; figuring out what the Court deemed the “limits” of congressional authority as outlined in Graham proves more
difficult.
The conclusion, however, is that when the Court is referring to “the
limits” that are imposed by the IP Clause, it is a clear reference to the
ways the IP Clause can be used as a constitutional norm in interpreting the statutory text of the Patent Act of 1952. The language of Graham indicates its status as a constitutional norm. The Court refers to
the goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of . . . useful Arts” as “the standard expressed in the Constitution [which] may not be ignored. And it
is in this light that patent validity requires reference to a standard
written into the Constitution.”205 The Court in Graham, rather than
attempting to rely on a given meaning, instead utilized the IP Clause
as an interpretative canon to help it determine the meaning of the text
of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952. The outcome of Graham is
clear as well; the patents at issue were found to be invalid under Section 103. Thus, we see that the Court in Graham utilized the text of
the IP Clause in exactly the way identified by Hiroshiro Motomura—
as an interpretative canon that expressly applies a constitutional
principle as way to discern the meaning of the statutory scheme embodied in the Patent Act of 1952. Graham’s language directly reflects
the Court’s use of the IP Clause in Motion Pictures.
Graham’s invocation of the IP Clause as constitutional norm used
to interpret statutes of the Patent Act of 1952 and other type of legislation could be seen as a singular case, an experiment never to be repeated. Graham, though, is not a singular case. Initially, as
discussed in Part III, Graham’s invocation of the IP Clause is consistent with how the Supreme Court invokes the IP Clause in Bauer,
Bobbs-Merrill, and Motion Picture in the jurisprudential revision of
203. 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
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the synthesized patent bargain. For instance, in Motion Picture, the
Court specifically referred to the IP Clause as way to interpret the
statutory provision of the Patent Act.
Moreover, the use of the IP Clause as a limit enjoyed a revival in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the New Deal Era.206 For
example, in a dissent in Special Equipment v. Coe, Justice Douglas
contended that the terms of the IP Clause achieve two goals.207 First,
according to Justice Douglas, the IP Clause provides the standards for
the exercise of congressional authority and also “sets the limits beyond
which it may not go.”208 Second, according to Justice Douglas, the IP
Clause also serves as “the guide for the interpretation of patent laws
enacted pursuant to that power.”209 This use of the IP Clause as an
interpretative canon enjoyed a significant jurisprudential recognition
during the New Deal Era and after the passage of the Patent Act of
1952.210
206.
207.
208.
209.

Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945).
Id. at 381–82 (emphasis added) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 381 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945) (“The
enactment of these provisions is the mode by which Congress has chosen to carry
into effect the policy sanctioned by the Constitution, Article I, s 8, Cl. 8 ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Inventors the exclusive Right to their Discoveries.’ The nature and extent of the
legal consequences of the expiration of a patent are federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the patent laws and the policies which they
adopt.”).
210. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536–37 (1966) (“Certainly this reading of ‘useful’ in the statute is within the scope of the constitutional grant, which states only
that ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the exclusive right to
‘Writings and Discoveries’ may be secured for limited times to those who produce
them. . . . Yet the patent statute is somewhat differently worded and is on its face
open both to respondent’s construction and to the contrary reading given it by the
Court.”); Ellis-Foster Co. v. Reichhold Chemicals, 198 F.2d 42, 43–44 (3d Cir.
1952) (“There is a general principle applicable to the right to a patent. It is that
the patentee must be the first inventor. This is the rule one would expect to find
pursuant to the purpose declared in the Constitution: ‘To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries’. An important rule,
applying the general principle just stated, is that, in a case where there is no
foreign element involved, either as to invention or inventor, the application to the
United States Patent Office speaks as prior invention as of the application date.”
(citation omitted)); H. Wenzel Tent & Duck Co. v. White Stag Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d
740, 743 (9th Cir. 1952) (“Such special privilege would be unwarranted were it
not for a specific provision in the United States Constitution giving Congress the
power to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries’. In the exercise of this Constitutional power, Congress has set
forth certain reasonable conditions which must be met in order for an individual
to obtain a government protected monopoly. To be patentable an invention or
discovery, or improvement thereon, must be ‘new and useful,’ must not have been
‘known or used’ in the United States or ‘patented or described in any printed
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Understanding that the IP Clause can serve as an interpretative
canon has significant consequences. If, as Justice Douglas noted, the
IP Clause has two purposes, permitting judicial review of congressional action and serving as an interpretative canon, our scholarship
needs to examine both purposes. Scholarship over the purpose of the
IP Clause, however, has been driven by intense debate over whether
the phrase “[to] promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts”
serves to limit the statutory authority of Congress in passing intellectual property legislation.211 The primary fulcrum of this debate is
publication’ in the United States or foreign country more than one year prior to
the application, and must not have been ‘in public use or on sale in this country’
for more than one year prior to the application nor ‘proved to have been abandoned.” (citation omitted)); Jenkel-Davidson Optical Co. v. Roberts Instrument
Co., No. 58 C 347 (3), 1961 WL 8150, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 1961) (“The Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, does not authorize the issuance of patents for mechanical skill alone, but authorizes the granting of exclusive right ‘to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ Under this authority Congress has provided,
in 35 U.S.C., § 101, that, ‘Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore.’”); McCashen v. Watson, 131 F.
Supp. 233, 236–37 (D.D.C 1955) (“This case is controlled by the very recent and
well-reasoned opinion of Chief Judge Laws in the case of Torok v. Watson11 where
it was stated, in accord with Congressional expression of the Constitutional provision, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ that the Patent Statute should be construed in in the light of its purpose to promote the welfare of
society by encouraging and stimulating discovery and invention. The requirement of invention should be examined in the light of the contribution the product
makes to the advancement of the arts and sciences. The statute itself makes no
strict and narrow requirement of invention.’ ” (footnote omitted)); Torok v. Watson, 122 F. Supp. 788, 790 (D.D.C 1954) (“Applications for patents must be measured against the basic requirement ‘to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.’ The patent statutes represent the Congressional expression of this
Constitutional provision, and should be construed in the light of its purpose to
promote the welfare of society by encouraging and stimulating discovery and invention.” (citation omitted)).
211. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 41, at 71; Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339–41 (2012) (examining the IP Clause’s external limitations by way of its textual and structural
makeup); Andrew M. Hetherington, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause
Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 467 (2003) (analyzing the textual nuances of the
IP Clause); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 277 (2004) (arguing that the limits of the IP Clause “do
not represent generally applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause or its limits”); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual
Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1787 (2006) (discussing the importance of history and structure when interpreting the IP Clause); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 372 (1999) (suggesting that the placement
of the IP Clause within Article I might be indicative of the Framers’ intent to
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whether the text of the IP Clause permits judicial review of congressional action as to intellectual property legislation. While this debate
serves an important purpose, ignoring how courts utilize the IP
Clause as an interpretative canon may undermine efforts to develop a
coherent theory of the IP Clause. Indeed, ignoring the use of the IP
Clause as an interpretative canon may undermine public interest
claims in intellectual property law. For instance, the Court may prefer to offer narrow readings of specific textual provisions of any given
act as opposed to striking down the entire legislation. A subtle reading of the purpose of the IP Clause thus offers the judges the ability to
preserve flexibility in the judicial review of intellectual property
legislation.
Second, examining how judges use the text of the IP Clause as an
explicit constitutional norm is helpful in explaining what often appears to be confusing or contradictory choices. A claim of doctrinal
lineage suggests that we must link the current jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court to specific choices to invoke different constitutional
lineages. I refer to these doctrinal lineages because while there is
often a family resemblance within the doctrinal lineages, differences
do occur within each lineage.
These doctrinal lineages are complex. For example, while this Article specifically considers the social-obligation principle and its gradual evolution in to the metaphor of the patent bargain, other
interpretative traditions exist that invoke the text of the IP Clause.
For example, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
share an interpretative lineage, which I term the “institutionalist tradition,” that suggests the text of the IP Clause should be only read to
delineate judicial deference to legislative decision making within intellectual property regulation.212 Another doctrinal lineage, shared
make this clause a “grant of rights and not a restriction on Congress’s powers”);
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2002) (comparing the text, structure,
and history of the IP Clause to other constitutional clauses); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a
Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 81 (2003) (proffering that the IP Clause’s language does indeed qualify and limit Congress’s patent and copyright powers). A
constitutional clause designed to regulate authority over an intellectual property
clause is also known as an “institutional allocation principle.”
212. Compare MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 410 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If ever a doctrine has established itself as part of
our law to be respected by the judiciary this is it. If it is to be changed, Congress
is there to change it. Perhaps Congress will see fit to reexamine the doctrine in
all its ramifications in the light of its history and the experience under it, and
with due regard to all factors relevant to our patent system. We cannot do that.
We can only adhere to the doctrine or overrule it. Until Congress does undo a
principle so embedded in our law, we should leave it where we find it.”), with
Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 884 (2012) (“We first address petitioners’ argument that Congress lacked authority, under the Copyright Clause, to enact § 514.
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by Justices William Douglas and Stephen Breyer, which I term the
“skeptical lineage” emphasizes that the text of the IP Clause demonstrates a patent is not a property interest but is instead a regulated
monopoly that can be subject to significant constitutional constraints.213 Finally, a third interpretative lineage, what I term the
“syncretic lineage,” exemplified by Justice Clarence Thomas, has in
many respects drawn on the constitutional common law tradition to
place regulatory limits on the exercise of patent rights.214
The existence, then, of competing lineages is an important indicator of the constitutional complexity within our intellectual property
jurisprudence. Recognition of these lineages, however, suggests how
modeling constitutional complexity can lead to a more complete picture of doctrinal formation in patent law in two key respects. First,
recognizing doctrinal lineages can help us read with more sophistication how doctrine shifts within patent law. For instance, recognizing
that Justice Douglas falls within a skeptical lineage helps to situate
how his decisions recognized significant common law exceptions under
Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 in, for example, Funk Brothers
The Constitution states that ‘Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive
Right to their . . . Writings.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Petitioners find in this grant of
authority an impenetrable barrier to the extension of copyright protection to authors whose writings, for whatever reason, are in the public domain. We see no
such barrier in the text of the Copyright Clause, historical practice, or our
precedents.”).
213. Compare Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827, 837
(1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We are, I think, inclined to forget that the power
of Congress to grant patents is circumscribed by the Constitution. The patent
power, of all legislative powers, is indeed the only one whose purpose is defined.
[The IP Clause] describes the power as one ‘To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’ This statement of policy limits the power itself.”), with Golan, 132 S.Ct. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“In order ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science’ (by which term the Founders
meant ‘learning’ or ‘knowledge’), the Constitution’s Copyright Clause grants Congress the power to ‘secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to
their . . . Writings.’ This ‘exclusive Right’ allows its holder to charge a fee to those
who wish to use a copyrighted work, and the ability to charge that fee encourages
the production of new material. In this sense, a copyright is, in Macaulay’s
words, a ‘tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers’—a bounty
designed to encourage new production. As the Court said in Eldred, “ ‘[t]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.’ ” (citation omitted)
(quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)).
214. For instance, Justice Thomas has explicitly revived a number of common law doctrines, including the doctrine of equivalents, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and the patent exhaustion doctrine, Quanta
Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).

946

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:901

Seed Co. v. Kalo Incolant Co.215 and Gottschalk v. Benson.216 Indeed,
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,217 Justice
Breyer’s important opinion on the common law exceptions under Section 101, he explicitly drew on Justice Douglas’s decisions in Funk
Brothers and Gottschalk. Specifically, Justice Breyer extended Justice
Douglas’s theory that improvidently granted patents inhibit speech to
outline a theory on why the common law exceptions existed within the
scope of modern patent law.218 Second, recognizing the existence of
lineages can link intellectual property decisions to broader constitutional discourse. Both Justice Douglas’s219 and Justice Breyer’s220
concerns about the communicative effects of improvidently granted
patents can and should be linked to their broader concerns within
their First Amendment jurisprudence.
Recognition of constitutional complexity suggests that intellectual
property scholars and intellectual property practitioners need to understand the links between intellectual property concerns and other
areas of the law. Concrete steps can be taken to achieve this goal.
From a scholarly standpoint, further empirical work can be undertaken to map the relationships within lineages, and the ways in which
different constitutional norms are employed within those lineages.
From a practitioner standpoint, appellate argumentation should become more nuanced, as advocates can predict outcomes more
accurately.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

333 U.S. 127 (1948).
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
Id. at 1293–94.
Justice Douglas is understood to be within a broader constitutional discourse, an
ardent defender of the First Amendment. He viewed it as “performing a social
function in maintaining a market place of ideas . . . essential to the working of the
democratic process . . . [and] as supplying the constitutional grounds for protecting each person in seeking to realize his or her individual potential as a man or
woman.” Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 356
(1974). When dealing with First Amendment cases, Douglas’s position “can fairly
be characterized as granting as great a protection from governmental interference as possible in an ordered society.” L. A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism:
Justice Douglas and the First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 402 (1974).
Douglas truly believed in the First Amendment’s command that the legislature
“shall make no law” regarding speech, and that no governmental justification was
factually sufficient to change his position. Id.
220. Paul Gerwitz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L. J. 1675,
1681 (2006) (outlining Breyer’s jurisprudence within the First Amendment
context).
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Constitutional Complexity and Theoretical Consequence
in Modern Patent Law

Beyond its practical effects, engaging with constitutional complexity in modern patent law has theoretical consequence as well. In employing a multivariate historical method, the Author hopes to capture
the ways regulatory institutions such as the Supreme Court have attempted to craft doctrine to be responsive to innovative and social disruption in the formation of modern patent law. Telling this story then
permits us to more fully consider the role of constitutional courts such
as the Supreme Court in intellectual property regulation. This Section considers how engaging with the Supreme Court’s constitutional
complexity offers a different way of viewing the institutional legitimacy in current patent governance.
In a previous work,221 Esther van Zimmeren and the Author analyzed an emerging model of patent governance that we termed “dynamic patent governance.” Dynamic patent governance, we claimed,
suggests that the formation of patent law should be examined holistically, with a focus on the interplay between the formal dimensions of
the law (regulatory actors such as the legislators, examiners, and judicial reviewers),222 and the informal dimension of the law (plural actors that seek to influence the formal dimensions).223 Crucially, we
identified the emerging conflict within the informal dimensions of law,
between “new” actors on the patent scene (whom we collectively term
the “patent civil society”) and the more settled stakeholders of the “epistemic” communities that have traditionally driven patent policy decision making.224 This conflict in patent law, we suggested, has begun
to disrupt patent policy decision making in domestic, regional and international patent law.225
Recognizing the effects of constitutional complexity, though, is useful when seeking methods for managing this conflict between the more
committed epistemic community and the patent civil society. Specifically, constitutional courts such as the Supreme Court often play a
221. Kali Murray & Esther van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance in Europe and
the United States: The Myriad Example, 19 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 287
(2011).
222. Id. at 295.
223. Id. at 296.
224. Id.at 308–13. We define epistemic community to be composed of “the dominant
core of these epistemic communities consists of transnational firms with important patent portfolios, technically sophisticated lawyers, legal academics, and legally trained scientific experts and officials.” Id. at 309. We define the patent
civil society as “policy-influencing civil society organizations, such as development and human rights NGOs, environmental and other pressure groups, trade
unions, consumer organizations, faith-based and inter-faith groups, and certain
professor organizations.” Id. at 310.
225. Id.at 312–14.
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role of managing conflict between these two sets of actors within the
informal dimension. Indeed, tracing the evolution of the social-obligation principle demonstrates the institutional responsiveness of the
Court to demands of public critics of patent law, such as the populist
social movement. Thus, the attempts of the Supreme Court to navigate between different communities play a crucial role in maintaining
the overall legitimacy of patent law.
Crucially, recognizing this role of mediation between actors within
the informal dimensions plays an important role in answering critics
of the Supreme Court’s intervention in patent law. For instance, a
common complaint is that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not
offer significant guidance to intellectual property practitioners.226
A response, upon consideration of the Supreme Court’s role as a
mediator, suggests that it is precisely because of the Court’s willingness to consider constitutional values227 or other doctrinal areas such
as antitrust law and consumer protection law that makes its patent
jurisprudence valuable to the overall legitimacy of patent law. The
Supreme Court’s guidance may act in an opaque manner to preserve
its legitimacy to a range of different audiences. This is a particularly
relevant concern given the potential for “industry capture” that might
impact legislative or administrative reform.228
Perhaps recognizing constitutional complexity will help us to move
beyond what has often been a narrow view of the purposes of the Supreme Court and other constitutional courts within a functional intellectual property system. Prompted by the Supreme Court’s often
scathing review of the Federal Circuit’s holdings in recent years, the
subject of the Supreme Court’s institutional intervention in intellectual property decision making has been the subject of substantial law
review literature.229 This literature, however, has often focused on
226. Donald Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning
Lead to Thin Law, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (discussing the
impact of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the practitioners within the patent
community).
227. Sapna Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Genetic Information, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 625 (2014) (addressing the impact of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause on the granting of genetic patents).
228. Melissa Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law, 54 WILLIAM & MARY L.
REV. 1959, 2013–18 (2013) (assessing industry capture within the context of patent and administrative law).
229. See, e.g., Thomas Hungar & Rajiv Mohan, A Case Study Regarding the Ongoing
Dialogue Between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court: The Federal Circuit’s Implementation of KSR v. Telefex, Inc., 60 SMU L. Rev. 559 (2013) (examining how the Federal Circuit addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR v.
Telefex, Inc.); Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving
Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 25 (2012) (assessing
the relationship of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court in patent adjudication); Peter Lee, Patent Law and Two Cultures, 120 YALE L. J. 2 (2010) (comparing the Federal Circuit’s formalist judicial reasoning to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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comparing how the Supreme Court (as a generalist court) conducts
review of the federal circuit (as a specialist court) decisions.
A model of constitutional complexity, while consistent with this
literature, also offers another way of constructing the Supreme
Court’s institutional legitimacy within the patent law. Tracing the
evolution of the social-obligation principle helps us to understand that
the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy within patent law is constructed not only from its style of reasoning but from its ability to offer
an authoritative forum for a public critique of patent law.
V. CONCLUSION
The orientation of intellectual property law towards constitutional
discourse in recent years is pronounced. Significant gaps exist, however, in the study of the relationship between constitutional law and
intellectual property law.
This Article contends that in many respects, scholarship in intellectual property law needs to discard its epistemic insularity, and
turns towards understanding intellectual property law as constitutional law.
Reorienting intellectual property towards constitutional discourse
will have significant consequences. This Article suggests three. First,
we need to rediscover the diverse ways in which the text of the IP
Clause has been read. This reorientation will likely have to be made
with a commitment to diverse historical methods. Second, we will
have to show greater sensitivity to how the doctrinal formation of patent law has served as a response to periodic social and innovative disruption in patent law. Again, sensitivity to these periodic disruptions
helps us to discern the primary role of the Supreme Court within current intellectual property regulation. Finally, we need engage with
constitutional complexity in practice and theory. In doing so, we can
more successfully discern the dual objectives of patent law, which seek
not only to incentivize the creative activity of a patent claimant but
also to protect the preconditions for creative activity by a range of
multiple stakeholders.230

holistic judicial reasoning); David Taylor, Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 413 (2013) (examining the appropriate rules-based standards within the context of patent
adjudication).
230. See Brief for Kali N. Murray & Erika R. George as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 2, 16–17, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No.12-398), 2013 WL 432954.

